Security Target

ST introduction

The reference of this ST is Secure Element N5B2M003CE410000 SN200 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q Security Target version 1.0, dated October 10, 2022

TOE

The TOE is **an open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification **[MIFARE-DES-EV2]** and the access control in the MIFARE services. See PP(s) for details.

This TOE is a maintenance of Secure Element N5B2M00386D20000 SN200 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q, referenced by Secure Element N5B2M00386D20000 SN200 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q, Security Target version 3.0, dated May 12, 2022, with identification MF-2200007-01 (security identifier) and D2A_2204_003 (functional identifier).

TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Secure Element N5B2M003CE410000 SN200 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q**, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

Field	Value
VendorID	0x04
HWMajorVersion	0x62
HWMinorVersion,	0x01
SWMajorVersion	0x02
SWMinorVersion	0x00
CWCY	0x4319

In addition, the TOE can be uniquely identified as per the JCOP user guidance manual [JCOP- UGM], using the GET DATA command with 0xDF4C tag, as follows:

Field	Тад	Value
JCOP ID	0x82	N5B2M003CE410000
Hardware ID	0x8C	0x23
DeviceType	0x87	0xC8

The DESFire EV2 applet consists of 4 components, as follows:

- DESFire mfcarrier-DFEV2-1.0.17.0Q-20191021 (SVN revision 50652)
- SIO Library interfacesio-1.0.10.0Q-20190116 (SVN revision 41581)
- MCM mcm-1.0.13.0Q-20191119 (SVN revision 51573)
- lib-DFEV2-1.0.17.0Q-20191021 (SVN revision 50652)

TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE component	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification	Certificate
			identifier	issue date
Hardware IC	SN200 B1.1	(diced)	ICCN0264	2019-05-14
	C04	wafer/module/card		
Crypto libraries	1.0.0	Embedded in	Included in the	-
		the above	ICCN	
JavaCard	JCOP 6.4	Embedded in	PCN0165.10	2019-05-29
	"SN200"	the above		
	R1.07.0			
MIFARE applet	1.0.17.0Q	Embedded in	D2A_2210_002	2022-10-10
		the above		

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to [MIFARE DESFIRE PP] (called "PP(s)" in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

Objectives See PP(s).

Extended components definition There are no extended components, see PP(s).

There are no extended components, see PP(

Security Requirements

Security Functional Requirements See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

Security Assurance Requirements See section "Conformance claims".

Rationale

See PP(s).

TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

References

[MIFARE-DES-EV2]MIFARE DESFire EV2 Reference Architecture, Rev. 1.4 (ra321914)Specification, Rev. 3.0[MIFARE DESFIRE PP]MIFARE DESFire EV1/EV2/EV3 Protection Profile v1.5[JCOP-UGM]JCOP 6.4 R1.07.0 User Guidance Manual September 2022