# Security Target

## ST introduction

The reference of this ST is **Combo CE 4.2.3 v1.0 with MIFARE Desfire EV1/M4Mv2 Security Target** version **1.1, dated 2020.08.17**.

## TOE

The TOE is **an open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification **[MIFARE-DES-EV1]** and the access control in the MIFARE services.
See PP(s) for details.

## TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Combo CE 4.2.3 v1.0 with MIFARE Desfire EV1/M4Mv2**, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

**Platform identification data (Combo CE 4.2.3 v1.0)**

Identification data Get Data command (tag FE)
Value for this product FE15060A**2B060104012A026E0103**0607**D0023F14FC0120**

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Javacard version | 2B060104012A026E0103 |
| OS information<br>- PDM counter<br>- OS release | <br>D0023F14FC<br>0120 |

**Applet identification data (DESFIRE EV1)**

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| VendorID | **0x40** (ISO affected value by NXP to Gemalto) |
| HWMajorVersion | **0x01** |
| HWMinorVersion, | **0x00** |
| SWMajorVersion | **0x01** |
| SWMinorVersion | **0x02** |

**Applet identification data (M4M v2)**

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| VendorID | **0x47454D414C544F** (“GEMALTO” ASCII in Hex) |
| HWMajorVersion | **Not required** |
| HWMinorVersion, | **Not required** |
| SWMajorVersion | **0x05** |
| SWMinorVersion | **0x00** |

### TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

| TOE component | Identification | Form of delivery | Certification identifier | Date of certificate issue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ST54J A01*** | | **(diced) wafer/module/card** | **ANSSI-CC-2019/20** | **18.04.2019** |
| **Crypto libraries** | | **Included in the PCN** | **PCN0179** | **07.08.2020** |
| **JavaCard** | | **Included in the PCN** | **PCN0179** | **07.08.2020** |
| **MIFARE applet** | | | **THIS** | |
| **(Pre)personalisation documentation** | | | **n/a** | **n/a** |

~~Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided.~~ No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

* The CC surveillance by ITSEF is done. Expected CC stamp ~march'20.

### Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to **[MIFARE DESFIRE PP]** (called "PP(s)" in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

## Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

## Objectives

See PP(s).

## Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

## Security Requirements

### Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

### Security Assurance Requirements

See section "Conformance claims".

### Rationale

See PP(s).

## TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

## References

[MIFARE DESFIRE PP] MIFARE DESFire Protection Profile v1.0

## ST revision history

1.0 Creation

1.1 Update: Platform identification data, M4M SWMajorVersion version and PCN number