# Security Target

## ST introduction

The reference of this ST is **Secure Element J5Q2M0027B840000 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q Security Target version 0.4, dated April 20, 2020.** 

#### TOE

The TOE is an open platform implementing the MIFARE specification [MIFARE-DES-EV2] and the access control in the MIFARE services. See PP(s) for details.

## TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Secure Element J5Q2M0027B840000 with MIFARE DESFire EV2 1.0.17.0Q** and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

Field	Value
VendorID	0x04
HWMajorVersion	0x52
HWMinorVersion	0x00
SWMajorVersion	0x02
SWMinorVersion	0x00
CWCY	<u>0x4319</u>

## The DESFire EV2 applet consists of 4 components, as follows:

- DESFire mfcarrier-DFEV2-1.0.17.0Q-20191021 (SVN revision 50652)
- SIO Library interfacesio-1.0.10.0Q-20190116 (SVN revision 41581)
- MCM mcm-1.0.13.0Q-20191119 (SVN revision 51573)
- lib-DFEV2-1.0.17.0Q-20191021 (SVN revision 50652)

#### TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification	Date of
component			identifier	certificate
				issue
Hardware IC	P73N2M0B0.2C6	(diced)	ICCN0251	2016-08-29
		wafer/module/card		
Crypto	1.0.8	Embedded in the	Included in	
libraries		above	ICCN	
JavaCard	J5Q2M0027B840000	Embedded in the	PCN0136.09	2016-11-29
		above		
MIFARE	1.0.17.0Q	Embedded in the	Functional:	2020-04-14
applet		above	D2A_2004_002	
			Security: MF-	
			2000003-01	

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided [MIFARE-DES-EV2]. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

### Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to [MIFARE DESFIRE PP] (called "PP(s)" in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

## Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

## Objectives

See PP(s).

## Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

# Security Requirements

## Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

## Security Assurance Requirements

See section "Conformance claims".

#### Rationale

See PP(s).

# **TOE Summary Specification**

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA VAN.5 level.

## References

[MIFARE DESFIRE PP] MIFARE DESFire Protection Profile v1.0 [MIFARE-DES-EV2] MIFARE DESFire EV2 Reference Architecture, ra321914