

Security Target

ST introduction

The reference of this ST is “**MIFARE DESFire EV2 in JCOP 4 R1.01 SecureBox on N7121 Security Target**” version **1.4_2** date **2022.06.08**.

TOE

The TOE is an **open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification [**MIFARE-DES-EV2**] and the access control in the MIFARE services.

See PP(s) for details.

TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as “**MIFARE DESFire EV2 in JCOP 4 R1.01 SecureBox on N7121**”, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

Field	Value
VendorID	0x04
HWMajorVersion	0x42
HWMinorVersion,	0x00
SWMajorVersion	0x02
SWMinorVersion	0x00
SW Sub-Type	0x06
BatchNo[4]	0x0E

In addition, the **Platform ID** is retrieved using the **GET DATA – IDENTIFY** command with tag 0x80CA. The 0x03 tag is returning the Platform build ID as specified in [JCOP-UGM]:

Field	Value
Platform build ID	4A335233353130323336333130343030DCE5C19CFE6D0DCF

TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE component	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification identifier	Certificate issue date
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Ded. SW and CL	N7121 B1	wafer	BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019	14 June 2019
JCOP 4 P71	JCOP 4 P71 RFP1.1 SPM71 FP1 RFP1.1	Embedded in the above	NSCIB-CC-180212	23 July 2019
MIFARE DESFire EV2 in JCOP 4 R1.00 P71 SecureBox	v9.2.3	Embedded in the above	D2A_1907_001	06 August 19
			MF-1900011-03	tbd

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to **[MIFARE DESFIRE PP]** (called “PP(s)” in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

Objectives

See PP(s).

Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

Security Requirements

Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

Security Assurance Requirements

See section “Conformance claims”.

Rationale

See PP(s).

TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

References

[MIFARE-DES-EV2] MIFARE DESFire EV2 Reference Architecture, Rev. 1.4 (ra321914)

[MIFARE DESFIRE PP] MIFARE DESFire EV1/EV2/EV3 Protection Profile v1.3