

Security Target

ST introduction

The reference of this ST is “**MIFARE Plus EV1 in JCOP 4 R1.01 SecureBox on N7121_Security_Target**” version **1.4_3** date **2022.07.13**.

TOE

The TOE is **an open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification [**MIFARE-PLUS-EV1**] and the access control in the MIFARE services.

See PP(s) for details.

The TOE that is undergoing maintenance was previously certified in **MF-1900010-03**.

TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as “**MIFARE Plus EV1 in JCOP 4 R1.01 SecureBox on N7121**”, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

| Field | Value |
|-----------------|-------------|
| VendorID | 0x04 |
| HWMajorVersion | 0x41 |
| HWMinorVersion, | 0x00 |
| SWMajorVersion | 0x01 |
| SWMinorVersion | 0x00 |
| SW Sub-Type | 0x06 |
| BatchNo[4] | 0x0E |

In addition, the **Platform ID** is retrieved using the **GET DATA – IDENTIFY** command with tag 0x80CA. The 0x03 tag is returning the Platform build ID as specified in [JCOP-UGM]:

| Field | Value |
|-------------------|---|
| Platform build ID | 4A335233353130323336333130343030DCE5C19CFE6D0DCF |

TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

| TOE component | Identification | Form of delivery | Certification identifier | Certificate issue date |
|--|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Ded. SW and CL | N7121 B1 | wafer | BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V2-2022 | 07 June 2022 |
| JCOP 4 P71 | JCOP 4 P71 FP1.1 SPM71 FP1 FP1.1 | Embedded in the above | NSCIB-CC-180212 | 05 July 2022 |
| MIFARE Plus EV1 in JCOP 4 R1.00 | v9.2.3 | Embedded in the above | P1A_1907_002 | 06 August 19 |
| | | | MF-1900010-04 | tbd |

| | | | | |
|-----------|--|--|--|--|
| SecureBox | | | | |
|-----------|--|--|--|--|

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to **[MIFARE PLUS PP]** (called “PP(s)” in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

Objectives

See PP(s).

Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

Security Requirements

Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

Security Assurance Requirements

See section “Conformance claims”.

Rationale

See PP(s).

TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

References

- [MIFARE-PLUS-EV1] MIFARE Plus EV1 Reference Architecture and Interface Specification, Rev. 1.6 (ra385514)
- [MIFARE PLUS PP] MIFARE PLUS EV0/EV1/EV2 Protection Profile v1.4