## Document information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keywords</td>
<td>SESIP Security Target, S32K312xGxx, S32K322xGxx, S32K341xGxx, S32K342xGxx, S32K314xGxx, S32K344xGxx, MWCT2D17Sxxxxxx, MWCT2D16Sxxxxxx, MWCT2016Sxxxxxx, MWCT2015Sxxxxxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Security target for evaluation of the S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors, according to SESIP Assurance Level 2 (SESIP2) based on SESIP methodology, version 1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Revision History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rev.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>November 14th 2022</td>
<td>Final release</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

This Security Target describes the S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS platform and the exact security properties of the platform that are evaluated against GlobalPlatform Technology Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP), version 1.1, SESIP Assurance Level 2 (SESIP2) [1].

1.1 ST Reference

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS , SESIP Security Target, Revision 1.0, NXP Semiconductors, 14 November 2022.

1.2 SESIP Profile Reference and Conformance Claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP Name</td>
<td>Wireless Power Consortium - Secure Storage Subsystem - SESIP Profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP Version</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance Claim</td>
<td>SESIP Assurance Level 2 (SESIP2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Platform Reference

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platform Name and Version</td>
<td>S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS , Rev 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform Identification</td>
<td>S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS , S32K312xGxx, S32K322xGxx, S32K341xGxx, S32K342xGxx, S32K314xGxx, S32K324xGxx, S32K344xGxx, MWCT2D17Sxxxxxx, MWCT2D16Sxxxxxx, MWCT2016Sxxxxxx, MWCT2015Sxxxxxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform Type</td>
<td>Vehicle microcontrollers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Memory Configuration</td>
<td>FULL_MEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 Guidance Documents

The following documents are included with the platform:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product Data Sheet</td>
<td>S32K3xx Datasheet [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESIP Security Target</td>
<td>S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS, SESIP Security Target, Revision 1.0, NXP Semiconductors, 14 November 2022.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Guidance Documents...continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application Note</td>
<td>AN13023, Selecting and using cryptographic algorithms and protocols [7]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5 Other Certification

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS development process has followed Business Creation and Management (BCaM) framework and is subject to Product Security Incident Response Process (PSIRP). The latest NXP (BCaM and PSIRP) processes have been certified as compliant.

1.6 Platform Overview and Description

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS vehicle microcontroller product series possesses Arm Cortex-M0 core, flash memory, ASIL-B and D rating and advanced security module. The product series devices are well suited to a wide range of applications in electrical harsh environments, and are optimized for cost-sensitive applications offering new, space saving package options. The product series offers a broad range of memory, peripherals and performance options. Devices in this series share common peripherals and pin-out, allowing developers to migrate easily within a chip series or among other chip series to take advantage of more memory or feature integration.

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS offers compliance to WPC requirements for support of the Qi authentication protocol v.3.x.

NXP S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS devices feature:

- An application domain, also referred to as the host, which comprises various system resources including one or several CPU subsystems; on-chip memory resources; several peripheral subsystems such as communication interfaces, timers, encoders/decoders, etc; interfaces to external memory resources; a system bus that is interconnecting all system resources together.
- A security domain, which is the Hardware Security Engine (HSE) subsystem, also referred as HSE_B. It has its own exclusive system resources and connects to the host via a dedicated interface.

Specifically for flash loadable image, in the security domain, the flash loadable HSE firmware are:

- The HSE firmware executable, hereafter referred to as FW-IMG. For instance, crypto library is included in FW-IMG.
- The HSE system image that contains public and private (secret) keys and configuration data (aka HSE system attributes), hereafter referred to as SYS-IMG

Any additional firmware, OS or application software is stored in the application domain on the platform, and it is not in scope of this evaluation, and hereafter referred as application image.

Table 4. HSE Firmware feature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HSE firmware feature</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA P256</td>
<td>NIST FIPS 186-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA256</td>
<td>NIST FIPS 180-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6.1 Platform Security Features

The Hardware Security Engine (HSE_B) is a subsystem that implements the security functions for the device. It provides cryptographic services to host CPUs, and fully meets the functional goals and objectives of the WPC requirements.

The HSE_B subsystem is responsible for establishing the root of trust on the device during the boot process and includes the following features:

- Trusted and Secure boot support
- Highly featured symmetric and asymmetric accelerators
- Support for various cryptographic functions (see Section 3.2.3.1)
- Arm Cortex-M7 CPU
- True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
- Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
- Firmware Over-the-Air (FOTA) support.
- Secure Debug

Secure Boot Assist Flash (aka SBAF) is a software component programmed in devices by NXP during production. This software component resides in the HSE code flash area. The features provided by this software component are:

- HSE firmware installation
- HSE firmware restoration
- Debug authorization
- Partition swapping enablement
- Support in firmware update
- Secure and JTAG based recovery mode

1.6.2 Platform Logical Scope

The logical scope is the S32K3xx microcontroller silicon chip including the on-chip ROM. The hardware components and interfaces are listed in Section 2.4 of [2] and Figure 1 shows the superset block diagram of the S32K3xx family.

![Figure 1. S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS Family Superset Block Diagram](image-url)
1.6.3 Platform Physical Scope

The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the hardware (including the on-chip SBAF) and the flash loadable updatable HSE firmware (i.e. FW-IMG and SYS-IMG) (either standard version or premium version) as shown in Figure 2. The versions for each components are as listed in Table 5. Note SYS-IMG contains keys and configurable data which is not a static image hence not listed in the table.

Any additional firmware, OS or application software stored on the platform (i.e. application image) is not in scope of this evaluation.

Table 5. Platform Deliverables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Release</th>
<th>Form of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IC Hardware</td>
<td>s32k3xx</td>
<td>Rev 1.0</td>
<td>Silicon Chip and On Chip ROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSE Firmware</td>
<td>s32k3xx HSE Firmware</td>
<td>8.2.3.0</td>
<td>Software package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBAF</td>
<td>s32k3xx SBAF Firmware</td>
<td>00 0D 08 00 09 00 01</td>
<td>Software package</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6.4 Required Non-Platform Hardware/Software/Firmware

S32K3xx has on-chip flash, which is used to store the FW image and SYS image.

1.6.5 Life Cycle

The life cycle (LC) is managed by the HSE subsystem, see Section 3.3.8 of [2] for further information. The LC states are as Table 6:

Table 6. Life Cycle States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC State</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NXP Internal</td>
<td>NXP manufacture and test state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUST_DEL</td>
<td>Device (i.e. NXP’s IC) delivered to system integrator (i.e. NXP’s customer) for ECU manufacturing and initial configuration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Life Cycle States...continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LC State</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEM_PROD</td>
<td>ECU (device) delivered to the OEM for vehicle integration and final configuration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN_FIELD</td>
<td>ECU integrated in the vehicle and operating; this is the state of normal device use (and most secure state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>ECU (device) failure; this is the state for functional testing of the IC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NXP ensures secure provisioning of the NXP credentials and secure life cycle configuration. NXP’s customer (also referred as OEM) will receive the device in CUST_DEL state, and shall perform software installation and configuration and OEM credential provision in CUST_DEL and OEM_PROD states and then configure the device to IN_FIELD state in their technical and/or procedural secure environment. The IN_FIELD state is the normal device use state and the only state it can switch into is FA which needs both OEM and NXP credential authentication.

2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

2.1 Platform Objectives for the Operational Environment

For the platform to fulfill its security requirements, the operational environment (technical or procedural) must fulfill the following objectives:

Table 7. Platform Objectives for the Operational Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platform Verification</td>
<td>The operating system or application code are expected to verify the correct version of all platform components it depends on, and it shall match the corresponding information from the guidance document.</td>
<td>Section 8 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Boot</td>
<td>The operating system or application code are expected to make use of the Secure Boot Mode by setting IVT Boot Configuration Word and Memory Verification Services.</td>
<td>Section 8 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Debug</td>
<td>The integrating environment is expected to configure the debug functionality as described in Section 3.6.3 of [2] to meet the extra physical attacker resistance.</td>
<td>Section 13.8 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure UID Uniqueness</td>
<td>The platform has a 64-bit UID and NXP ensures uniqueness across platform instances. Although the probability is low to have the same UID for a platform instance with another type of device, the actors in charge of platform management shall ensure there is no UID conflation, and hence the UID is unique to the platform instance depending on use case.</td>
<td>Section 3 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Management out of the Platform</td>
<td>Cryptographic keys and certificates outside of the Platform are subject to secure key management procedures. Keys shall be provisioned for corresponding security functions, including: attestation, memory authentication and encryption, secure debug.</td>
<td>Section 7 of [2]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Security Requirements and Implementation

3.1 Security Assurance Requirements

The claimed assurance requirements package is: **SESIP Assurance Level 2 (SESIP2)** as defined in Chapter 4 of GlobalPlatform Technology Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP), version 1.1 [1].

3.1.1 Flaw Reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR.2)

In accordance with the requirement for flaw reporting procedures (ALC_FLR.2), the developer has defined the following procedure:

- **Reporting.** The process begins when the PSIRT becomes aware of a potential security vulnerability in an NXP product. The reporter receives an acknowledgment and updates throughout the handling process.
- **Evaluation.** The PSIRT confirms the potential vulnerability, assesses the risk, determines the impact and assigns a processing priority. If the vulnerability is confirmed, the priority determines how the issue is handled throughout the remaining steps in the process.
- **Solution.** Working with PSIRT, the product team develops a solution that mitigates the reported security vulnerability. Solutions will take different forms based on the nature. Because of the nature of NXP products – mostly silicon products where the firmware is in ROM –, very often the solution can only be provided in a next version of the chips and the short-term solution will consist of recommending security measures to be applied in systems using the NXP product.
- **Communication.** As said above, because of the nature of the NXP products, the solution to systems using the affected products often needs to be found in additional countermeasures in those systems. The communication on the vulnerability and solutions will in most cases be done directly towards the affected customers. For

### Table 7. Platform Objectives for the Operational Environment...continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure Update</td>
<td>The operating system or application code are expected to enable secure communication for security update, and in case of update, the update image is expected to be properly signed and distributed in secure manner as well. The operating system or application code are expected to use the anti-roll back feature.</td>
<td>Section 12 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifecycle Management</td>
<td>The operating system or application code are expected to configure the LC state according the stage of product development and deployment.</td>
<td>Section 3.3.8 of [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Length</td>
<td>The operating system or application code are expected to select an appropriate algorithm and key length set to fulfill the security requirement for the intended use case, including ECDSA P256 and SHA 256</td>
<td>[7]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
previously unknown or unreported issues, NXP will acknowledge the reporter of the issues (unless the reporter requests otherwise).

The hardware and firmware located in the on-chip ROM of S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS cannot be updated due to their immutable nature. The HSE FW has the capability of change and the platform’s Secure Boot feature is able to verify the authenticity of HSE FW during the initial boot and outside of the boot sequence. See Section 3.2.2.1 for further information.

The platform’s Secure Boot feature further supports to verify the authenticity of customer code, providing an appropriate mechanism for supporting the update of customer code. The update mechanism beyond of the scope of has to be provided by the customer, and such mechanism as well as the customer code is not in scope of this evaluation.

### 3.2 Security Functional Requirements

In the following Security Functional Requirements, the term **platform** covers the S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS physical and logical scope, and the term **application** refer to any additional firmware, OS or application software which is out of evaluation scope. It represents a part of the final connected device.

S32K3xx / MWCT2xxxS fulfils the following security functional requirements:

#### 3.2.1 Identification and Attestation of Platforms and Applications

**3.2.1.1 Verification of Platform Identity**

**Requirement**

The platform provides a unique identification of the platform, including all its parts and their versions.

**Refinement**

Assets and protections related to this SFRs are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. Refinement Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS module Platform Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conformance rationale**

The hardware identification and version protected in integrity can be obtained as follow:

- Via JTAG as described in chapter 9 “System Integration Unit Lite2 (SIUL2)” of SOC reference manual [4] The register name where this info is stored is “SIUL2 MCU ID Register #1 (MIDR1)”.
- HSE Firmware version is readable by using HSE Get Attribute Services and `hseAttrFwVersion_t.64` bit
- SBAF version number can be read through HSE GPR register at address 0x4039C020

#### 3.2.1.2 Verification of Platform Instance Identity

**Requirement**

The platform provides a unique identification of that specific instantiation of the platform, including all its parts and their versions.
Refinement

Assets and protections related to this SFRs are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Protection required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSS module Platform Identity</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Refinement Operations

Conformance rationale

A 64-bit unique device identifier (UID) is provisioned to identify the SSS module platform identity. It can be read from the location 0x1B000040 in UTEST area and is protected in integrity. See Section 3.2.3 of [2]

3.2.1.3 Attestation of Platform Genuineness

The platform provides an attestation of the “Verification of Platform Identity” and “Verification of Platform Instance Identity”, in a way that cannot be cloned or changed without detection.

Conformance rationale:

Attestation of the platform genuineness is provided by UID for the HW and SHE-UID in conjunction with HSE status for FW and SBAF. Within those unique identifiers, data identifying the hardware platform uniquely with its different versions of SBAF and HSE can be retrieve by the user for assessment of genuineness against the documentation. For more information on UID, see section 3.2.3 of [2], for more information on SHE-UID and HSE status see sections 9.6 & 7 of [2].

HSE FW provides SHE-UID retrieve function where HSE return the UID and the 8 bit of HSE status with CMAC calculated over the concatenation of input challenge, UID and status using MASTER_ECU_KEY, where both the platform instance identity and the status are attested.

3.2.1.4 Secure Initialization of Platform

Requirement

The platform ensures its authenticity and integrity during the platform initialization. If the platform authenticity or integrity cannot be ensured, the platform will go to reset state.

Refinement

Assets and protections related to this SFRs are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Protection required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSS module firmware</td>
<td>Integrity, authenticity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conformance rationale

SBAF has the responsibility to authenticate, decrypt and load HSE Firmware during firmware installation. Once the HSE FW is installed, SBAF passes the control to HSE firmware to perform a secure boot operation by authenticating the application images. SBAF ensures in particular the integrity and authenticity of the firmware. The complete initialization flow is described in HSE FW reference manual version 1.2 in Chapter 3 under the section “External System Interfaces” [2]
3.2.2 Product Lifecycle: Factory Reset / Install / Update / Decommission

3.2.2.1 Secure Update of Platform

Requirement
The platform can be updated to a newer version in the field such that the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the platform is maintained.

Refinement
Assets and protections related to this SFRs are:

Table 11. Refinement Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Protection required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSS module Firmware and Software</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS module Firmware and Software</td>
<td>Monotonic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conformance rationale
The host can update FW-IMG via the service defined by the structure hseFirmwareUpdateSrv_t. This functionality ensures a monotonic update as well as maintaining its integrity.

New FW-IMG delivered by NXP is encrypted by Firmware Delivery Key (FDK) RSA 2048 at NXP’s Trust Centre. FDK is stored in HSE-B OTP Storage area.

While performing the Secure Update, HSE reads the FDK to decrypt the new FW-IMG. This is how, confidentiality of the new FW-IMG is ensured in the update process.

New FW-IMG is signed by NXP’s Private key at NXP’s Trust Centre. New IMG is checked by the public key during the secure update process. The said public key is part of New FW IMG.

Hash of the public key is stored in OTP area of SoC during NXP’s production

Above mechanisms establish authenticity and Integrity.

More details can be found in Chapter 12 “HSE Firmware Update” of [2] and in Chapter 4.7 “HSE Info Block” of [3]

3.2.3 Cryptographic Functionality

3.2.3.1 Cryptographic Operation

Requirement
The platform provides the application with operations in Table 12 functionality with algorithms in Table 12 as specified in specifications in Table 12 for key lengths described in Table 12 and modes described in Table 12.

Refinement

Table 12. Cryptographic Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Key Lengths / Message Lengths</th>
<th>Modes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hashing</td>
<td>SHA 256</td>
<td>NIST FIPS 180-4</td>
<td>256 (message)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12. Cryptographic Operations...continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Key Lengths / Message Lengths</th>
<th>Modes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature generation</td>
<td>ECDSA P256</td>
<td>NIST FIPS 186-4</td>
<td>256 (key)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conformance rationale:
Cryptographic operations SHA256 and ECDSA256 are provided by HSE and HSE FW. See Section 7 of [2].

3.2.3.2 Cryptographic Key Generation

Requirement
The platform provides the application with a way to generate cryptographic keys for use in algorithms in Table 13 as specified in specifications in Table 13 for key lengths described in Table 13.

Refinement

Table 13. Cryptographic Key Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Key Lengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECC key generation</td>
<td>ECDSA P256</td>
<td>FIPS 186-4</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conformance rationale
Cryptographic key generations for ECC are provided by HSE and HSE FW. See Section 7 of [2].

3.2.3.3 Cryptographic KeyStore

Requirement
The platform provides the application with a way to store Qi private key ECDSA-P256 such that not even the application can compromise the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality of this data. This data can be used for the cryptographic operations Qi authentication support of the Power Transmitter by the Power Receiver.

Refinement

Table 14. Cryptographic KeyStore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Security Property</th>
<th>List of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qi private key ECDSA-P256</td>
<td>Authenticity, integrity and confidentiality</td>
<td>Qi authentication support of the Power Transmitter by the Power Receiver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conformance rationale
HSE provides key management functions. NVM and RAM key properties and values are stored and updated within SYS-IMG and saved securely in secure data flash. Furthermore, policies and access right authentications are implemented, and key access right is determined by execution rights, Host Identity (HID), and key attributes. This covers in particular the Qi private key ECDSA-P256. See Sections 7.1 to 7.3 of [2].
3.2.3.4 Cryptographic Random Number Generation

Requirement
The platform provides the application with a way based on DRBG to generate random numbers to as specified in NIST.SP.800-90A Hash-DRBG with SHA256

Conformance rationale
In the HSE, the source of entropy is provided by the physical true random number generator, and the generation function is part of a Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG, aka DRBG or PRNG) module as defined in NIST SP 800-90A and CAVP certified (refer to Section 1.5).

- TRNG is capable to pass AIS 31 statistical tests T0-T8
- DRNG is capable to pass AIS 20 statistical tests T1-T5

See more in Section 7.5 of [2], and Section 9.1 of [6].

3.2.4 Compliance Functionality

3.2.4.1 Secure Debugging

Requirement
The platform only provides JTAG interface authenticated as specified in Section 3.6.2 of [2] with debug functionality.

The platform ensures that all data stored by the application, with the exception data stored in external(outside SoC) storage is made unavailable.

Refinement
All assets defined in other Security Functional Requirements and accessible through the Secure Debugging mechanism shall be protected against unauthorized access.

For debug functionality authentication, device specific credentials shall be used.

Conformance rationale
The debugging of the HSE subsystem and associated firmware is restricted to NXP engineering teams.

The host debug has a configuration option, wherein it can either protected or permanently disabled in OEM_PROD and IN_FIELD LC states.

In case of "protected", JTAG can be accessed by challenge Response Mechanism.

In case of permanently disabled, then even challenge-response does not give access. Hence, no debug is possible for such Chips.

Application can choose which configuration option needs to be used for specific usecases.

See more in Section 3.6.2 of [2] and Chapter 76-79 of [2].
3.2.5 Extra Attacker Resistance

3.2.5.1 Limited Physical Attacker Resistance

The platform detects or prevents attacks by an attacker with physical access before the attacker compromises Secure Initialization of Platform, Secure Update of Platform and Secure Debugging.

Conformance rationale:

Countermeasures are implemented to within the S32K3xx source code to protect against physical attacks, enforced by SBAF and HSE-B firmware.

4 Mapping and Sufficiency Rationales

4.1 SESIP2 Sufficiency

Table 15. SESIP2 Sufficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assurance Class</th>
<th>Assurance Family</th>
<th>Covered By</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASE: Security target evaluation</td>
<td>ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction</td>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>The ST reference is in Section 1.1, the TOE reference in Section 1.3, the TOE overview and description in Section 1.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASE_OBJ.1 Security requirements for the operational environment</td>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>The objectives for the operational environment in Section 2 refer to the guidance documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASE_REQ.3 Listed security requirements</td>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>All SFRs in this ST are taken from [1]. SFR &quot;Identification of Platform Type&quot; is included. SFR &quot;Secure Update of Platform&quot; is mentioned but refers to ALC_FLR.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification</td>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>All SFRs are listed per definition, and for each SFR the implementation and verification are defined in the SFR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADV: Development</td>
<td>ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specifications</td>
<td>Section 1.4</td>
<td>The evaluator will determine whether the provided evidence is suitable to meet the requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGD: Guidance documents</td>
<td>AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance</td>
<td>Section 1.4</td>
<td>The evaluator will determine whether the provided evidence is suitable to meet the requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures</td>
<td>Section 1.4</td>
<td>The evaluator will determine whether the provided evidence is suitable to meet the requirement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15. SESIP2 Sufficiency...continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assurance Class</th>
<th>Assurance Family</th>
<th>Covered By</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALC: Life-cycle support</td>
<td>ALC_FLR-2 Flaw reporting procedures</td>
<td>Section 3.1.1</td>
<td>The flaw reporting and remediation procedure is described.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATE: Test</td>
<td>ATE_IND-1 Independent testing: conformance</td>
<td>Material provided to evaluator.</td>
<td>The evaluator will determine whether the provided evidence is suitable to meet the requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVA: Vulnerability assessment</td>
<td>AVA_VAN-2 Vulnerability analysis</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>The evaluator performs penetration testing, to confirm that the potential vulnerabilities cannot be exploited in the operational environment for the TOE. Penetration testing is performed by the evaluator assuming an attack potential of Basic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Bibliography

5.1 Evaluation Documents


5.2 Developer Documents

6 Legal information

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