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Certification Report

Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module

Firmware version: 7.7.0, 7.7.1, 7.7.2, or 7.8.5

Bootloader version: 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4, or 1.1.5

Hardware versions: 808-000048-002, 808-000048-003, 808-000073-001, 808-000073-002, 808-000066-001, 808-000069-001, 808-000070-001

Sponsor and developer:	**Thales DIS CPL Canada Inc.** **20 Colonnade Road, Suite 200,** **Ottawa, Ontario K2E 7M6** **Canada**
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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 "General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories".

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module. The developer of the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module is Thales DIS CPL Canada Inc. located in Ottawa, Canada and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module (i.e. the TOE) is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI-E card (Thales Luna PCIe HSM). It is operated in a controlled environment and can be used either as a standalone device to be inserted in a server, or as a device embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM.

The TOE is also suitable for use in support of electronic signature and electronic sealing operations, certificate issuance and revocation, time stamp operations, and authentication services, as identified by the (EU) No 910/2014 regulation [EU-REG] of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS). For that purpose, the present Security Target has been explicitly written to comply with [PP 419221-5]; the TOE supports Assigned Keys, External Key Storage and Key Import/Export operations as defined in the PP.

The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 20-07-2022 (CC-22-195307). The current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 05-09-2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The major changes are the addition of a firmware variant bringing the total number of firmware variants to four.

The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] [1] for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting Procedures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

The TOE is stated as a Qualified Signature Creation Device and Qualified Seal Creation Device for the purposes of electronic identification and trust services as detailed by the [EU-REG]. The

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[1] The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

evaluation by SGS Brightsight B.V. included an examination of the TOE according to the eIDAS Dutch Conformity Assessment Process Version 6 0.

TrustCB B.V., as the Dutch eIDAS-Designated Body responsible in The Netherlands for the assessment of the conformity of qualified electronic signature and/or qualified electronic seal creation devices declares that the evaluation meets the conditions for eIDAS certification for listing on the EU eIDAS compiled list of Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Devices.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module from Thales DIS CPL Canada Inc. located in Ottawa, Canada.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Hardware	808-000048-002 808-000048-003 808-000073-001 808-000073-002 808-000066-001 808-000069-001 808-000070-001	n/a
Software	Firmware	7.7.0, 7.7.1, 7.7.2 or 7.8.5
	Bootloader	1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4 or 1.1.5

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module. For details, see section 2.5 "Documentation" of this report.

2.2 Security Policy

- Storage and management of cryptographic keys inside containers (i.e. partitions). The TOE supports a mandatory Admin Partition and several (optional) User Partitions. For a given partition, the management and usage of the related key material is restricted to the roles assigned to that partition, therefore enforcing a strict isolation between the different partitions managed inside the TOE.
- Enforcement of per-partition authenticated user roles with varying privileges.
- Enforcement of user authentication (either token-based or password-based) and per-key authorization before allowing users to perform TSF-mediated actions as defined in [ST].
- Cryptographic functions (as fully detailed in [ST]) including:
  - Digital signature generation and verification
  - Message digest generation
  - Message authentication code generation and verification
  - Encryption and decryption (symmetric and asymmetric)
  - Key generation
  - Key derivation
  - Generation of shared secret values
  - Cryptographic support for one time password and other non-PKI based authentication mechanisms
  - Random number generation
- Key management functions.
- Secure Trusted Channel (STC) for confidentiality and integrity protection of communication between TOE and Remote Client Applications.
- Firmware update.
- Auditing functionalities.
- Self protection mechanisms:
  - Voltage and temperature monitors and zeroization response
  - Passive shield (for K7 TOE variant) / active shield (for K7+ TOE variant).

2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].

2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

It should be noted that user-defined ECC curves are not included in this certification. Only the curves defined in [ST] section 6.3 are included in the evaluation scope of this certification.

> Note that EN 419221-5 Protection Profile [EN419221-5] claims the environment for the TOE protects against loss or theft of the TOE, deters and detects physical tampering, protects against attacks based on emanations of the TOE, and protects against unauthorised software and configuration changes on the TOE and the hardware appliance in which it is contained ("OE.Env Protected operating environment").
>
> The ST follows the PP and also claims OE.Env, thus the environment in which the TOE is used must ensure the above protection.
>
> Any threats violating these objectives for the environment are not considered.

2.4 Architectural Information

The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module (i.e. the TOE) is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI-E card (Thales Luna PCIe HSM). It is operated in a controlled environment and can be used either as a standalone device to be inserted in a server, or as a device embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM.

The TOE can fulfil general purpose HSM use cases, where assured cryptographic services alongside generation and management of cryptographic keys is required.

The TOE is also suitable for use by Trust Service Providers (TSP) supporting electronic signature and electronic sealing operations, certificate issuance and revocation, time stamp operations, and authentication services, as identified by the (EU) No 910/2014 regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS). For that purpose, the present Security Target has been explicitly written to comply with the Protection Profile [PP]; the TOE supports Assigned Keys, External Key Storage and Key Import/Export operations as defined in the PP.

The TOE also supports the option for further customization of the HSM for a given integration through the ability to load 3rd party developed code (non-TOE) in the form of Functional Modules (FM) onto the HSM.

The TOE provides cryptographic functions, and manages (and protects) the cryptographic keys used by these functions. Note that the TOE is not aware of the context in which a cryptographic function is used. Any such context is therefore the responsibility of client applications used by the trust service provider or operator, and these client applications need to use the cryptographic functions in an appropriate way. In general, this will be achieved by suitable configuration of the TOE and its stored data.

Local client applications reside in the same hardware appliance as the TOE, e.g. in the case of the TOE being a PCI-E card inside a server, local client applications are the applications running within the same server boundary and using the TOE's services through the PCI-E bus. Another example of local client application is an embedded application running inside the physical boundary of the TOE and using the Luna FM API. Note that the secure environment is considered sufficient to provide the authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection needed for communication between the TOE and local applications.

External client applications communicate remotely with the TOE through a network connection and over a secure channel identified as Secure Trusted Channel (STC) which provides authentication of its end-points and protection of confidentiality and integrity of data sent over the channel.

The high level logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows:

Figure 1 Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, TOE logical boundary

2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
007-013968-001, Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part1: Preparative Procedures	Revision N, 21 April 2025
007-000465-001, Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part2: Operational Guidance (General)	Revision T, 21 April 2025
007-000466-001, Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part3: eIDAS Guidance	Revision M, 21 April 2025
007-000467-001, Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part4: TOE Integration for use in Composite Evaluation	Revision M, 21 April 2025

2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification and module-to-module interaction level. Several proprietary automated test suites are used, supported by execution of

cryptographic test suites (such as known answer tests) and to demonstrate FPT_PHP.1 and FPT_PHP.3 requirements from [PP 419221-5] (and hence compliance with ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Security Level 3) physical hardware tests were also performed.

For the testing performed by the evaluators in this evaluation, the developer test environment was used. The evaluators repeated the developer tests, as well as executing additional test cases designed by the evaluator.

2.6.2   Independent penetration testing

The AVA_VAN.5 assurance class requires the evaluator to conduct a methodical vulnerability analysis based on publicly available source of information and based on structured examination of the evidence while performing other evaluation activities (ASE, ADV, AGD, ALC & ATE).

Given the restrictions imposed by the PP (which prevents any physical attack and any side channel attack that requires physical proximity to the TOE), the evaluator focused on vulnerabilities related to logical design/architectural flaws in the TOE implementation that would lead intended users to abuse the TOE.

A total of 12 weeks of effort were applied to the execution of the penetration test cases during the baseline evaluation. For the first re-certification the evaluators performed an analysis the penetration testing results obtained during the baseline evaluation and confirmed that the results are still valid as there have been no developments in tooling or techniques for the logical tests since the tests were executed in the baseline evaluation.

For this certification, the total test effort expended by the evaluators was 1 week. During that test campaign, 0% of the total time was spent on physical attacks, 0% overcoming sensors and filters, 0% perturbation attacks, 0% retrieving keys with FA, 0% side-channel attacks, 100% exploitation of test features, 0% attacks on RNG, 0% software attacks, and 0% application isolation penetration tests.

2.6.3   Test configuration

The [ST] lists seven HW part numbers, four bootloader versions and four firmware versions for TOE variants. The evaluators assessed the differences and concluded that they were not security impacting.

The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was the same as described in the [ST].

2.6.4   Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).

The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.

For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.

2.7   Reused Evaluation Results

This is a new certification, but documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused. The vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of three Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

2.8   Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module and associated version numbers as detailed in *Identification of Target of Evaluation.*

2.9   Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the *[ETR]*, which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to *[COMP]* a derived document *[ETRfC]* was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is "**Pass**".

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target *[ST]*.

The Security Target claims 'strict' conformance to the Protection Profile *[EN419221-5]*.

2.10   Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 "Documentation" contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: **User-defined ECC curves**.

Not all key sizes specified in the *[ST]* have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

3 Security Target

The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, 002-010985-001, rev.W, 21 April 2025 *[ST]* is included here by reference.

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

IT	Information Technology
FM	Functional Modules
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
STC	Secure Trusted Channel
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSP	Trusted Service Provider

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[eIDAS-REP]	Assessment Reporting Sheet eIDAS - Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, 25-RPT-850, Version 1.0, 26 June 2025
[EN419221-5]	EN 419 221-5:2018, Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules – Part 5 Cryptographic Module for Trust Services, v1.0, registered under the reference ANSSI-CC-PP-2016/05-M01, 18 May 2020
[ETR]	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - Evaluation Technical Report EAL4+, version 6.0, 04 September 2025
[ETRfC]	Evaluation Technical Report for Composition Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module – EAL4+, version 7.0, 04 September 2025
[EU-REG]	REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
[JIL-AAPHD]	Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes, Version 3.1, November 2023.
[JIL-AMHD]	Attack Methods for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes, Version 3.0, February 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022
[ST]	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, 002-010985-001, rev.W, 21 April 2025

(This is the end of this report.)