

Security Target

ST introduction

The reference of this ST is **Security Target for Mobile FeliCa Applet4 on Connected eSE v1.3 version v1.1**

TOE

The TOE is an IC Platform composed with the FeliCa Crypto Lib and the FeliCa Applet. Designed to meet the security functionality of the Mobile FeliCa Applet Protection Profile[MFAPP].

TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Mobile FeliCa Applet4 on Connected eSE v1.3**, and is named and uniquely identified by its response to the **Request Product information** command sent from a FeliCa Reader/Write, as follows:

Field	Field	Value
FeliCa applet	Request Product information	0x 02 03 09

In addition, the platform and the hardware can be uniquely identified as per the user guidance manual [AGD1], using the GET DATA command with 0xFE tag, as follows:

	Field	Value
Connected eSE 5.3.4 v1.2	OS information - OS release	01 09

TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE component	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification identifier	Certificate issue date
Hardware IC	ST54L	(diced) wafer	ICCN0300	04-04-2023
Javacard	Connected eSE 5.3.4 v1.2	Embedded in the above	PCN0199.02	30-06-2023
FeliCa Crypto library	FeliCa Crypto-Library	Embedded in the above	FAST-2400116-01	12-12-2024
FeliCa applet	Mobile FeliCa Applet4 on Connected eSE v1.3	Embedded in the above	n/a	n/a
Guidance documentation	GP based Mobile FeliCa IC Chip System Specification for Pre-issuance Process in chip vendor for	Pdf	n/a	n/a

	Mobile FeliCa Applet4 on Connected eSE platform v1.2			
	Mobile FeliCa Applet4 TAP Interaction User's Manual v1.2	Pdf		
	Applet Upgrade Specification for Thales OS v1.0	Pdf		

The TOE claims the following FeliCa Crypto library packages of the [MFAPP] section 6:

DES1 DES2 DES3 AES1 AES2

Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to the Mobile FeliCa Applet Protection Profile (called “[MFAPP]” in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

This ST is CC Part 2 conformant:

- Exactly, the SFRs of the [MFAPP] are included by reference.

The ST is CC Part 3 conformant:

- The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.**

The rationale behind these claims is the requirement that the FeliCa security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this [MFAPP] for this TOE type (FeliCa products).

Security Problem Definition

Refer to [MFAPP].

Objectives

Refer to [MFAPP].

Extended components definition

Refer to [MFAPP].

Security Requirements

Security Functional Requirements

Refer to [MFAPP].

Security Assurance Requirements and Rationale

See section “Conformance claims”.

TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the FeliCa services in accordance to the FeliCa specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

References

- [MFAPP] FeliCa Networks, Inc. Mobile FeliCa Applet Protection Profile, version 1.0
- [AGD1] Thales, Platform Identification and Configurability Connected eSE 5.3.4 v1.2, version 1.3