Security target Lite of HED Secure Chip

CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0

Version 1.0
Date 2024-04-26

CEC Huada Electronic Design Co., Ltd.
## REVISION HISTORY

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<th>Revision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
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<td>1.0</td>
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### Abbreviation

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Common Criteria</td>
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<td>CKMU</td>
<td>ClocK Management Unit</td>
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<td>CMS</td>
<td>Chip Management System</td>
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<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Cyclic Redundancy Check</td>
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<td>DMA</td>
<td>Direct Memory Access</td>
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<td>DES/TDES</td>
<td>Data Encryption Standard/Triple Data Encryption Standard</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Differential Fault Analysis</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Electronic Codebook</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Cryptography</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>Error Data Check</td>
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<td>EMMU</td>
<td>Enhanced Memory Management Unit</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Fault Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLASH</td>
<td>FLASH memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPIO</td>
<td>General Purpose IO</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Integrated Circuit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Laser Detector</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Message Authentication Code</td>
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<td>MPU</td>
<td>Memory Protection Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKE</td>
<td>Public Key Engine</td>
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<td>PWMU</td>
<td>PoWer Management Unit</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Protection Profile</td>
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<td>PUF</td>
<td>Physical Unclonable Functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Random Access Memory</td>
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<td>ROM</td>
<td>Read-Only Memory</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Rivest-Shamir-Adleman</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFR</td>
<td>Security Functional Requirements</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Side Channel Attack</td>
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<td>SDL</td>
<td>Security Delay Latch</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Security Target</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWD</td>
<td>Serial Wire Debug</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Serial Wire Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Template Attack</td>
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<td>TOE</td>
<td>Target of Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRNG</td>
<td>True Random Number Generator</td>
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Glossary

AHB2SFR
AHB2SFR module executes SFR bus decoding and access control.

Debug mode
The mode in which debug functions are available.

ECDH/ECDSA
NIST standard algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

EFUSE
EFUSE is an Electrical Fuse module.

End-user
Users of the composite product in phase 7.

IC Dedicated Software
IC dedicated software which is normally recognized as IC firmware and is developed by IC developer and embedded in a security IC. The IC dedicated software is mainly used for testing purpose (IC dedicated test software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC dedicated support software).

NVR
NVR is the abbreviation of Nov-Volatile Register, which is implemented by a special block of FLASH. This special block of FLASH will occupy the address space which is invisible by users.

SecurCore
The ARM CPU family contains a high-performance and highly energy efficient processors in it.

Security IC
Composition of TOE, the security IC embedded software, user data and package (the security IC carrier).

Security IC Embedded Software
Security IC embedded software supplies the security IC application and standard services and normally is developed other than IC designer. The embedded software is designed in phase 1 and embedded into the security IC in phase 3 or later phases of the security IC product life-cycle.
Security IC Product
Integration of security IC and Embedded software is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in sense of supporting document.

Sfr-registers
Special Function Registers.

TOE Delivery
The TOE is delivered in form of packaged product after phase 5.

Non-user FLASH
The area of FLASH that users are not authorized to read or write.

RNG1
The hardware module implements the true random number generator.

RNG2
The hardware module implements the random number generator.

User FLASH
The area of FLASH that users are authorized to read or write.

pFlash
Technology name defined by SMIC.

SCI
The interface that is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816 standard.

Test mode
The mode in which test functions are available.

Non-test mode
The mode in which test functions are disabled and protected by hardware after the chip is sawed.

X25519
X25519 is an elliptic curve based Diffie-Hellmann key exchange algorithm in accordance with the Montgomery curve called Curve25519.
1 ST INTRODUCTION

This introduction chapter contains the following sections:
1.1 Security Target Reference and TOE Reference
1.2 TOE Overview
1.3 TOE Description

1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference

1.1.1 ST Reference

The Security Target reference is “Security target lite of HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0, V1.0”.

1.1.2 TOE Reference

The TOE is identified in one configuration named “HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0”. All components of the TOE and their respective version numbers are listed in Table 1. In this document the TOE is abbreviated to HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0.

1.2 TOE Overview

1.2.1 Introduction

The TOE are the IC hardware with IC Dedicated Software which is stored in Non-user FLASH and documentations which describes the instruction set and the usage [7] [8] [9] [10].

The main usage of the TOE is for SIM, eSE and eSIM applications. And the scope of the TOE includes the IC hardware and IC dedicated software which is constituted of Chip Management System (CMS), Cryptographic and functional library and Lib file API library. CMS implements the functionality of booting process controlling. The Cryptographic and functional library implements the arithmetic functions of RSA (with key length from 512 bits to 4096 bits), ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA), X25519, AES (with 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits key size) and TDES (with 2 keys mode)
which are stored in Non-user FLASH. The Lib file API library also includes a random number generation function which is in form of Lib file API library files.

The IC hardware is a microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit (CPU), Direct Memory Access (DMA) Controller, instruction/data cache, memories accessible via Enhanced Memory Management Unit (EMMU), cryptographic coprocessors, Random Number Generator (RNG), Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), sensors, test protection, debug protection, clock/reset/power management units and communication interfaces. The CPU (ARM SC300) processor is a high-performance and highly energy efficient processor for the use in microcontrollers and embedded applications that require a performance optimized processor for the use in environments where security is an important consideration. On-chip memories are RAM and FLASH. The FLASH contains non-user FLASH and user FLASH for data and program storage. The whole FLASH consists of memory cells followed by the parity check values for data integrity check.

The documentation includes:
- HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 _Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE) [7]
- HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 _Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE) [8]
- HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 _Product Datasheet [9]
- HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 _Crypto and Function Library User Guide [10]

1.2.2 TOE usage and major security functionality

Since a security IC is intended to be used in a potential insecure environment, it must provide high security in particular when being used by the embedded software in the SIM, eSE and eSIM applications. Hence the TOE shall maintain:

- the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and while processed in the device
- the memory access controlled by memory address and different chip modes
- the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE

This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionalities.

The TOE provides hardware for implementations of secure applications with:

- ARM SC300 CPU with security mechanisms which is a member of the ARM family of SecurCore 32-bit microprocessors
- Security detectors including high and low temperature detectors, internal and external frequency detectors, internal and external voltage detectors, the external
CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 Security Target

- glitch detector and light detectors
- Active shielding against physical attacks
- TDES/DES coprocessor (2 keys TDES mode) with countermeasures against SCA
- AES coprocessor (with 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits key size) with countermeasures against SCA
- Hardware coprocessor PKE which facilitated the RSA, ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA) and X25519 implementations supporting large integer arithmetic operations of modular multiplication, modular addition, modular subtraction, point addition and point doubling (These operations are used by software to implement the RSA, ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA) and X25519 functions. Based on the RSA/ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA) and X25519 function, the countermeasures for RSA/ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA) and X25519 against attacks of SCA, DFA and FA are implemented by software.)
- Memory access control enabled by chip modes and EMMU
- Memory data encryption and address scrambling
- Data integrity check for RAM and FLASH
- Security-sensitive registers protection
- Bus mask
- RNG1 module serves with a highly reliable true random number generator, which is compliant with PTG.2 class of AIS20/31[2013] [20]
- RNG2 module serves with internal random numbers, which is only used for security mechanism (e.g. masking)
- Test mode protection (based on EFUSE and soft fuse)
- Debug mode protection
- Self-test function
- SDL
- PUF

The TOE contains the following hardware, but they are not claimed as security functions.
- Chinese domestic cryptographic coprocessors: SM1, SM3, SM4 and SM7
- CRC coprocessors (CRC16 and CRC32)
- TDES/DES coprocessor (DES mode)
- HASH coprocessors: SHA1, SHA256

The TOE provides software for implementations of secure applications with:
- CMS is for booting process controlling
- Cryptographic and functional library for the functions of 2 key TDES, AES (with 128 bits, 192 bits and 256bits key size), ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA), X25519 and private key functions of RSA (with key length from 512 bits to 4096 bits) in non-user Flash
- Lib file API library for the functions of a highly reliable true random number generation API interface with FA countermeasures cooperating with hardware
which is compliant with PTG.2 class of AIS20/31[2013], a deterministic random number generation API with FA countermeasures which is compliant with DRG.3 class of AIS20/31[2013].

The TOE contains the following cryptographic algorithms and functions, but they are not claimed as security functions.

- Power Management API
- SHA Algorithm API
- Get Algorithm API Version API
- Flash Translation Layer API
- Enhancing Chip Stability Solution API
- Get Chip Unique Serial Number API
- Get Chip Firmware Total Version API
- APIs in ECC library except ECDH/ECDSA
- Ed25519 Algorithm API
- Chinese domestic cryptographic algorithms (SM2, SM3, SM4 and SM9)
- APIs in RNG library except the true/deterministic random number generation APIs
- 3key TDES algorithm API
- DES Algorithm API
- APIs in RSA library except the private key calculation APIs

1.2.3 TOE type

The TOE is HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0 intended for use as a security IC.

1.2.4 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

None.

1.3 TOE Description

1.3.1 Physical Scope of TOE

The HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 is manufactured in an SMIC 40nm pFlash technology. A block diagram of the IC is depicted in Figure 1.
The scope of the TOE includes the IC hardware, CMS, Cryptographic and functional library and Lib file API library.

Table 1: Components of the TOE scope

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Release</th>
<th>Form of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IC Hardware</td>
<td>CIU98M50</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security IC Dedicated Software</td>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>In non-user FLASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cryptographic and functional library</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>In non-user FLASH (APIs of RSA, TDES, DES, AES, SHA, ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA), X25519, Chinese domestic cryptographic algorithms, power management, Flash operation and version-get.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib file API library</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>Lib file (APIs of random number generation function, Enhancing Chip Stability Solution, chipID-get and Lib file API library version-get) CIU98M50_ED25519.lib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1:** Hardware Blocks of the TOE (the security-not-claimed parts are indicated with red color)
The components of the TOE scope are listed in Table 1. The common components of the TOE are listed in Table 2:

Table 2: Common Components of the TOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Release</th>
<th>Form of delivery</th>
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<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0_Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE)</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>The PDF Electronic Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0_Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE)</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>The PDF Electronic Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0_Product Datasheet</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>The PDF Electronic Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>HED Secure Chip CIU98M50 V1.0 with IC Dedicated Software V1.0_Crypto and Function Library User Guide</td>
<td>V1.0</td>
<td>The PDF Electronic Document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The electronic documents (.pdf files) will be delivered as the package with pgp signed and encrypted via Email.
1.3.2 Logical Scope of TOE

1.3.2.1 Hardware Description
The hardware blocks of the TOE are shown in figure 1. The main blocks are described as following:

**CPU (SC300)**
The CPU used in the TOE is ARM SC300.

**DMA controller**
DMA controller for data transfer from memory to peripheral, peripheral to memory, memory to memory.

**Memory**
64 kBytes RAM, 8 kBytes Instruction Cache, 8 kBytes Data Cache and 2560 kBytes FLASH are presented in the TOE.

For all the memories, the data storage unit is 36 bits which consists of 32 bits data followed by 4 bits parity check values.
The FLASH includes 2560 kBytes Bulk area, 3.5 kBytes NVR areas, 0.25 kBytes NVR configuration areas and 32 kBytes extra area for Mifare data. The page size of the FLASH is 512 Bytes.

**MPU**
Supported by SC300.

**EMMU**
Area and chip mode based memory access control to RAM and FLASH is implemented by EMMU.

**Coprocessors**
- The TDES/DES coprocessor supports TDES and DES operations with ECB mode and CBC mode. TDES supports 2-key operation with two 56-bit keys (key length of 112 bits). The TDES/DES coprocessor supports countermeasures against SCA.
- The PKE coprocessor supplies basic arithmetic functions to support the implementation of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms RSA, ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA), X25519, SM9, Ed25519 and SM2 in Cryptographic and functional library.
- The AES coprocessor supports the AES operations. The AES coprocessor supports countermeasures against SCA.
- The Chinese domestic cryptographic coprocessors of SM1, SM3, SM4 and SM7 support SM1, SM3, SM4 and SM7 operations respectively. The security of this
component is not claimed.

- The CRC coprocessors provides CRC generation polynomial CRC-16 \((X^{16} + X^{12} + X^5 + 1)\) and CRC-32 \((X^{32}+X^{26}+X^{23}+X^{16}+X^{12}+X^{11}+X^{10}+X^8+X^7+X^5+X^4+X^2+X+1)\). The security of this component is not claimed.

**TRNG (RNG1)**

A highly reliable true random number generator compliant with PTG.2 class of AIS20/31[2013], which consists of a provable physical noise source and well-designed post-processor.

**Internal random number generator (RNG2)**

The random number generator is for the internal use of the chip which is invisible by the user. The security of this component is not claimed.

**PUF**

**TEST**

The test functionalities and test mode protection is implemented in the TEST block. The test mode is protected by the TEST block and not available anymore after phase 4.

**DEBUG**

The debug functionalities is implemented in the SWD block and CPU block, and the debug mode protection is implemented in the SEC block.

**Power (PWMU)**

The TOE provides 4 power modes for chip power management, which are:

- Normal power mode (chip operating mode)
- Standby power mode (power saving mode)
- Stop clock power mode
- Power down power mode

**SEC**

Security management module supports the active shielding working and auto-check, detectors auto-check, memory data encryption key and memory address scrambling key refreshing, security features flags management and debug enable control.

**Reset (RSTMU)**

System reset management module supports the boot-up sequence and the reset mechanisms of the chip.
Clock (CKMU)
Chip clock management module supports the configurations for the clock frequency settings of system and coprocessors.

Interfaces
- SCI module supports ISO/IEC 7816 Interface and proprietary factory code exporting.
- GPIO
- I2C
- SWP
- SPI
- UART

Detectors
Detectors are for extreme environmental conditions detection. Detectors present the self-test feature.

Internal random number generator (RNG2)
The random number generator is for the internal use of the chip which is invisible by the user. The security of this component is not claimed.

Other major components
- Programmable timers
- Watchdog
- Oscillator (OSC)
- AHB2SFR, AHB2PERI, AHB2CRYPTO and AHB2APB1 Bridge are the connection modules between buses who supports the transferring of the bus signals for different buses.

The TOE can be configured by software using special function registers that influence the hardware behavior of the TOE. The registers shall be set according the corresponding software guidance [7].

For security reasons the data sheet and security guidance will not be published but only delivered to the security IC embedded software developer of the composite product. The TOE supports Test Mode and Non-test Mode. Test Mode has unlimited access to the hardware components, and is only valid during manufacture. Non-test Mode has restricted access to the hardware components, like CPU, special function registers and the memories. Special function registers for the hardware components control for the Security IC Embedded Software are interrelated to the activities of the CPU, DMA controller, MPU, EMMU, interrupt control, I/O configuration, FLASH, timers, interfaces and coprocessors.
Sensitive registers protection, which is data integrity check, is performed on the sensitive registers.

The end-user will receive TOE running in Non-test Mode with disabled test functionality. The disabling of the test functionality is performed after production testing and protected by hardware countermeasures.

Debug Mode is a submode under Non-test Mode and has limited access used for debug purpose only. The disabling of the debug functionality is performed after production debugging and protected by hardware countermeasures.

1.3.2.2 Software Description
The IC Dedicated Software includes CMS, cryptographic and functional library and Lib file API library.

**CMS**
CMS is for booting process controlling. The user program which is downloaded to the user FLASH during the manufacture will be booted at the end of CMS execution. The download process is disabled when the TOE is delivered to the end-user.

**Cryptographic and functional library**
Cryptographic and functional library includes the functions of TDES, AES, ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA), X25519 and RSA with key length from 512 bits to 4096 bits. TDES Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against TA, DFA and FA. DES Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against TA, DFA and FA. AES Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against TA, DFA and FA. ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA) Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against SCA, DFA and FA. X25519 Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against SCA, DFA and FA. RSA Cryptographic library supports countermeasures against SCA, DFA and FA.

Cryptographic and functional library also includes the functions of SHA, Chinese domestic cryptographic algorithms (with SM2, SM3 and SM4 and SM9 included), power management, Flash operation and version-get. However, the security of these components is not claimed.

**Lib file API library**
Lib file API library includes the functions of a highly reliable true random number generation API interface with FA countermeasures cooperating with hardware which is compliant with PTG.2 class of AIS20/31[2013], a deterministic random number generation API with FA countermeasures which is compliant with DRG.3 class of AIS20/31[2013].
Lib file API library also includes the functions of Enhancing Chip Stability Solution, chipID-get, Ed25519 and Lib file API library version-get. However, the security of these components is not claimed.

1.3.3 TOE Life Cycle

The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can be separated into seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite Product life cycle cover the IC development and production:

- IC Development (Phase 2)
  - IC design
  - IC Dedicated Software development
- The IC Manufacturing (Phase 3)
  - Integration and photomask fabrication
  - IC production
  - IC testing
  - Preparation and pre-personalization if necessary

The Composite Product life cycle phase 4 and phase 5 are included in the evaluation of the IC:

- The IC Packaging (Phase 4)
  - Security IC packaging (and testing)
  - Pre-personalization if necessary
- The Composite Product finishing process, preparation and shipping to the personalization line for the Composite Product (Composite Product Integration Phase 5)

In addition, three important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life cycle:

- Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1)
- The Composite Product personalization and testing stage where the User Data is loaded into the Security IC's memory (Personalization Phase 6)
- The Composite Product usage by its issuers and consumers (Operational Usage Phase 7) which may include loading and other management of applications in the field
Figure 2: Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties

The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in Phase 1. The TOE is developed in Phase 2, produced in Phase 3 and packaged in phase 4. Then the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 or after Phase 5 in form of modules with embedded software integrated in it, depending on the customer’s order. The “Composite Product Manufacturer” includes all roles responsible of the TOE during phase 1, 5 (optional), and 6. The CMS loader function is disabled before the delivery of the TOE.

2. Conformance Claims

This chapter is divided into the following sections:
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
2.2 PP Claim
2.3 Package Claim
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
2.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Security Target and the TOE claims conformance to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to:


For the evaluation the following methodology will be used:

- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS 34): Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+(CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6(CC v3.1), Version 3, 03.09.2009

This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.

2.2 PP Claim

This Security Target is strict compliant to the Protection Profile:

- Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 13.01.2014, registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0084

The short term for this Protection Profile used in this document is “BSI-PP-0084” or “PP”.

Since the Security Target claims conformance to this PP, the concepts are used in the same sense. For the definition of terms refer to the BSI-PP-0084, these terms also apply to this Security Target. This Security Target also includes conformance to packages defined in the BSI-PP-0084:

- Package "TDES" (with augmentations)
- Package "AES" (with augmentations)

The TOE provides additional functionality, which is not covered in PP. In accordance
This ST does not claim conformance to any other protection profile.

2.3 Package Claim

This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL6 augmented. The augmentations to EAL6 are ALC_FLR.1.

This Security Target claims conformance with the Security IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0084.

The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This assurance level conforms to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile.

Note: The BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”, to which this Security Target claims conformance (for details refer to section 2.3), requires assurance level EAL4 augmented. The changes, which are needed for EAL6, are described in the relevant sections of this Security Target.

2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale

This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0084).

The TOE type defined in this Security Target is security IC which is consistent with the TOE definition in Security IC Platform Protection Profile.

All sections of this Security Target, in which security problem definition, objectives and security requirements are defined, clearly state which of these items are taken from PP and which are added in this Security Target. Therefore, this is not repeated here. Moreover, all additionally stated items in this Security Target do not contradict the items included from the BSI-PP-0084 (see the respective sections in this document). The operations done for the SFRs taken from PP are also clearly indicated.

The evaluation assurance level claimed for this target (EAL6+) is shown in section 6.2 to include respectively exceed the requirements claimed by the BSI-PP-0084.
These considerations show that the Security Target correctly claims strict conformance to PP.

### 3. Security Problem Definition

This Security Target claims conformance to the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”. Assets, threats, assumptions and organizational security policies are taken from PP. This chapter lists these assets, threats, assumptions and organizational security policies, and describes extensions to these elements in detail.

#### 3.1 Description of Assets

The assets of the TOE are all assets described in section 3.1 of “Security IC Platform Protection Profile”.

#### 3.2 Threats

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”, the threats defined in section 3.2 of PP are valid for this Security Target. The threats defined in PP are listed below in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.Leak-Inherent</td>
<td>Inherent Information Leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Phys-Probing</td>
<td>Physical Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Malfunction</td>
<td>Malfunction due to Environmental Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Phys-Manipulation</td>
<td>Physical Manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Leak-Forced</td>
<td>Forced Information Leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Abuse-Func</td>
<td>Abuse of Functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.RND</td>
<td>Deficiency of Random Numbers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TOE provides access control to the memories and to hardware resources.

The TOE shall avert the threat “Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access (T.Unauthorized-Access)” as specified below.

T.Unauthorized-Access Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access
Adverse action: An attacker may try to read, modify or execute code or data stored in restricted memory areas. And or an attacker may try to access or operate hardware resources that are restricted by executing code.

Threat agent: Attacker

Asset: Execution of code or data belonging to the Security IC Dedicated Software

Table 4: Additional threats averted by the TOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.Unauthorized-Access</td>
<td>Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”, the policy P.Process-TOE “Protection during TOE Development and Production” in PP is applied here as well.

In accordance with Application Note 5 in PP there is one additional policy defined in this Security Target as detailed below.

The TOE provides specific security functionality, which can be used by the Security IC Embedded Software. In the following, specific security functionality is listed, which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment. It can only be decided in the context of the application against which threats the Security IC Embedded Software will use this specific security functionality.

The IC Developer/Manufacturer therefore applies the policies as specified below:

P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic services of the TOE

The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services for the IC Embedded Software:

- DES/TDES encryption and decryption
- AES encryption and decryption
- private key functions of RSA (with key length from 512 bits to 4096 bits)
- ECC (with ECDH/ECDSA)
- X25519
3.4 Assumptions

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile” the assumptions defined in section 3.4 of PP are valid for this Security Target. The following table lists these assumptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.Process-Sec-IC</td>
<td>Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.Resp-Appl</td>
<td>Treatment of User Data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Security Objectives

This chapter contains the following sections: “Security Objectives for the TOE”, “Security Objectives for the Operational Environment” and “Security Objectives Rationale”.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The TOE shall provide the following security objectives, which are taken from the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.Leak-Inherent</td>
<td>Protection against Inherent Information Leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Phys-Probing</td>
<td>Protection against Physical Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Malfunction</td>
<td>Protection against Malfunctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Phys-Manipulation</td>
<td>Protection against Physical Manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Leak-Forced</td>
<td>Protection against Forced Information Leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Abuse-Func</td>
<td>Protection against Abuse of Functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Identification</td>
<td>TOE Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.RND</td>
<td>Random Numbers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following additional security objectives are defined based on package functionality provided by the TOE as specified below:

O.TDES       TDES Functionality
The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to calculate a Triple DES encryption and decryption to the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE supports directly the calculation of TDES with up to two keys.

Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data (and especially cryptographic keys) during Triple DES operation. This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent.

O.AES AES Functionality

The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to calculate a AES encryption and decryption to the Security IC Embedded Software.

Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data (and especially cryptographic keys) during AES operation. This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent.

O.RSA RSA functionality

The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality to perform an RSA signature generation and decryption with key lengths up to 4096 bits to the Security IC Embedded Software.

O.ECC ECC functionality

The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality to perform an ECC signature generation and key exchange to the Security IC Embedded Software.

O.X25519 X25519 functionality

The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality to perform a Curve25519 based key exchange to the Security IC Embedded Software.

Regarding Application Notes 8 and 9 in PP the following additional security objectives are defined based on additional functionality provided by the TOE as specified below:
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following security objectives for the operational environment are specified according to the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile”.

Table 7: Security objectives for the operational environment, taken from PP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security objective</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Applies to phase…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OE.Process-Sec-IC</td>
<td>Protection during composite product manufacturing</td>
<td>TOE delivery up to the end of phase 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE.Resp-Appl</td>
<td>Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

OE.Process-Sec-IC

Protection during composite product manufacturing

Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE (OE.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.

OE.Resp-Appl

Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE

Security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security needs of
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

Section 4.4 in the BSI-PP-0084 “Security IC Protection Profile” provides a rationale how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies are addressed by the objectives that are specified in the BSI-PP-0084. Table 8 reproduces the table in section 4.4 of PP.

Table 8: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption, Threat or Organizational Security Policy</th>
<th>Security Objective</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.Resp-Appl</td>
<td>OE.Resp-Appl</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Process-TOE</td>
<td>O.Identification</td>
<td>Phase 2 – 3 optional Phase 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.Process-Sec-IC</td>
<td>OE.Process-Sec-IC</td>
<td>Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Leak-Inherent</td>
<td>O.Leak-Inherent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Phys-Probing</td>
<td>O.Phys-Probing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Malfunction</td>
<td>O.Malfunction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Phys-Manipulation</td>
<td>O.Phys-Manipulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Leak-Forced</td>
<td>O.Leak-Forced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Abuse- Func</td>
<td>O.Abuse- Func</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.RND</td>
<td>O.RND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following table provides the justification for the additional security objectives. They are in line with the security objectives of the BSI-PP-0084 and supplement these according to the additional threats and organizational security policies.

Table 9: Additional Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption, Threat or OSP</th>
<th>Security Objective</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.Unauthorized-Access</td>
<td>O.Mem-Access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Crypto-Service</td>
<td>O.TDES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O.AES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O.RSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O.ECC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The justification of the additional policy, threat and assumption is given in the following description.

The justification related to the threat “Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access (T.Unauthorized-Access)” is as follows:

According to O.Mem-Access the TOE must enforce the partitioning of memory areas so that access to memory areas is controlled. Restrictions are controlled by the chip modes and EMMU. Thereby security violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include code) can be prevented (refer to T.Unauthorized-Access). The threat T.Unauthorized-Access is therefore countered if the objective is met.

The justification related to the security objectives O.TDES, O.AES, O.RSA, O.ECC and O.X25519 is as follows: Since these objectives require the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Crypto-Service, the organizational security policy is covered by the objectives.

The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumptions show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the BSI-PP-0084 for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

5. Extended Components Definition

There are four extended families defined and described for the TOE:

- the family FCS_RNG at the class FCS Cryptographic Support
- the family FMT_LIM at the class FMT Security Management
- the family FAU_SAS at the class FAU Security Audit
- the family FDP_SDC at the class FDP User data protection

The extended components FCS_RNG.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FAU_SAS.1 and FDP_SDC.1 are defined and described in the BSI-PP-0084 section 5.

6. Security Requirements

This part of the Security Target defines the detailed security requirements that shall be
satisfied by the TOE. The statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and assurance security requirements that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives for the TOE. This chapter consists of the sections “Security Functional Requirements”, “Security Assurance Requirements” and “Security Requirements Rationale”.

The CC allows several operations to be performed on security requirements (on the component level); refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 8.2 of Part 1 of the CC [1]. These operations are used in the PP [6] and in this Security Target, respectively.

The refinement operation is used to add details to requirements, and, thus, further restricts a requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that added words are in bold text and changed words are crossed out.

The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the PP [6] or CC in stating a requirement. Selections having been made are denoted as italic text.

The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments having been made are denoted by showing as italic text.

The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. It is denoted by showing brackets “[iteration indicator]” and the iteration indicator within the brackets.

6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

The security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE are defined and described in PP section 6.1 and in the following description.

The Table 10 provides an overview of the functional security requirements of the TOE, defined in PP [6] section 6.1. In the last column it is marked if the requirement is refined. The refinements are also valid for this ST.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFR</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Refined in PP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRU_FLT.2</td>
<td>Limited fault tolerance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPT_FLS.1</td>
<td>Failure with preservation of secure state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_LIM.1</td>
<td>Limited capabilities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_LIM.2</td>
<td>Limited availability</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above extended components FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1, FCS_RNG.1, FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are introduced in PP to define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE as additional families FAU_SAS of Class FAU, FDP_SDC of Class FDP, FCS_RNG of Class FCS and FMT_LIM of the Class FMT (Security Management). This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.

The above SFRs are applied entirely to the ST. The application notes from the PP are elaborated below:

- **FPT_FLS.1**

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below.

**FPT_FLS.1**

**Failure with preservation of secure state**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: *exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur*.

Application note: The failures will cause an alarm signals to be triggered, which will result in a special function register bit to be set and a reset (secure state). This address Application Note 14 in PP [6].

---

1 [assignment: list of subjects]
Generation of additional audit data is not defined for “Limited fault tolerance” (FRU_FLT.2) and “Failure with preservation of secure state” (FPT_FLS.1). This address Application Note 15 in PP [6].

**FPT_PHP.3**

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FPT_PHP.3</th>
<th>Resistance to physical attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical to:</td>
<td>No other components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependencies:</td>
<td>No dependencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FPT_PHP.3.1

The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing\(^1\) to the TSF\(^2\) by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application note: If a physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected, an alarm will be automatically triggered by the hardware, which will cause the chip to be reset. This address Application Note 19 in PP [6].

All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements of the TOE are done in PP and in the following description.

**FAU_SAS.1**

The additional component FAU_SAS.1 is introduced to define the security functional requirements of the TOE of the Class FAU (Security Audit). This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data and is described in the following.

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified

---

\(^1\) [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]  
\(^2\) [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FAU_SAS.1**  
Audit Storage  
Hierarchical to: No other components  
Dependencies: No dependencies

**FAU_SAS.1.1**  
The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery\(^1\) with the capability to store the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software\(^2\) in the FLASH\(^3\).

- **FDP_SDI.2**

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” as specified below.

**FDP_SDI.2**  
Stored data integrity monitoring and action  
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring  
Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP_SDI.2.1**  
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for inconsistencies between stored data and corresponding EDC\(^4\) on all objects, based on the following attributes: EDC value for the FLASH and RAM\(^5\)

**FDP_SDI.2.2**  
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall trigger reset or exception\(^6\).

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application note: EDC is performed on all the memories.

Refinement: The errors of EDC check happened to data in RAM and instructions stored in FLASH will trigger a reset, while data stored in FLASH will trigger an exception.

- **FDP_SDC.1**

---

1. [assignment: list of subjects]  
2. [assignment: list of audit information]  
3. [assignment: type of persistent memory]  
4. [assignment: integrity errors]  
5. [assignment: user data attributes]  
6. [assignment: action to be taken]
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)” as specified below.

**FDP_SDC.1**  
**Stored data confidentiality**  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FDP_SDC.1.1**  
The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the *FLASH and RAM*.  

---

**FCS_RNG.1**  
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RNG.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FCS_RNG.1[PTG.2]**  
**Random number generation (Class PTG.2)**  
Hierarchical to: No other components  
Dependencies: No dependencies

**Note:** The definition of the Security Functional Requirement FCS_RNG.1 has been taken from [5]

**Note:** The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of FCS_RNG.1 defined in PP [6] according to [5]

**FCS_RNG.1.1[PTG.2]**  
The TSF shall provide a *physical* random number generator that implements:

**(PTG.2.1)**  
A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.

**(PTG.2.2)**  
If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.

---

1 [assignment: memory area]  
2 [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic]  
3 [selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a post-processing algorithm of class DRG.2 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output entropy]
The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.

The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.

The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously\(^1\). The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time\(^2\).

The TSF shall provide octets of bits\(^3\) that meet:

Test procedure A\(^4\) does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.

The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

The TSF shall provide a deterministic\(^5\) random number generator that implements:

If initialized with a random seed using PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source\(^6\), the internal state of the RNG shall have 127 bits of entropy\(^7\).

The RNG provides forward secrecy.

The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known\(^8\).

The TSF shall provide octets of bits\(^2\) that meet:

The RNG initialized with a random seed using PTRNG of

---

1 [selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, applied upon specified internal events]
2 [assignment: list of security capabilities]
3 [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]
4 [assignment: additional standard test suites] Note: according §295 in [5] the assignment may be empty
5 [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic]
6 [selection: using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source, using a PTRNG of class PTG.3 as random source, using an NPTRNG of class NTG.1 [assignment: other requirements for seeding]]
7 [selection: have [assignment: amount of entropy], have [assignment: work factor], require [assignment: guess work]]
8 [assignment: list of security capabilities]
class PTG.2\(^i\) generates output for which \(2^{128}\) strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability \(1-2^{-23}\).  

\[(\text{DRG.3.5})\] Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A\(^4\).

By this, all assignment/selection operations are performed. This Security Target does not perform any other/further operations than stated in the PP [6].

Considering Application Note 12 of the PP [6] in the following paragraphs the additional functions for cryptographic support and access control function are defined. These SFRs are not required by the PP [6].

The Table 11 provides an overview about the augmented security functional requirements, which are added additional to the TOE and defined in this ST. All requirements are taken from Common Criteria Part 2 [2].

Table 11: Augmented security functional requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFR</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDP_ACC.1</td>
<td>Subset access control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP_ACF.1</td>
<td>Security attribute based access control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS_COP.1</td>
<td>Cryptographic operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS_CKM.4</td>
<td>Cryptographic key destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Memory access control**

The TOE provides Chip mode and Area based Memory Access Control.

The security service being provided is described in the Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control Policy. The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” requires that this policy is in place and defines the scope where it applies. The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” defines security attribute usage and characteristics of policies. It describes the rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as identified in FDP_ACC.1. The decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon chip mode and area based access permission control. The permission control information is evaluated by the hardware so that access is granted
or denied.

The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”:

**Memory Access Control Policy**

The TOE shall control read, write and execute accesses at different chip modes (CMS mode, Non-CMS mode, Debug mode, Non-Debug mode) on data including code stored in memory areas.

The Memory Access Control Policy is enforced on the following access ports, which are: CPU access over the bus system and DMA controller access over the bus system.

The Memory Control Policy controls access to memories by EMMU and all the memory control policies implemented in EMMU are fixed in hardware.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.

**FDP_ACC.1**

**Subset access control**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP_ACC.1.1**

The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy\(^1\) on all subjects: the software and DMA controller; all objects: defined regions in memory and all the operations: read, write, execute defined in the Memory Access Control Policy\(^2\).

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below.

**FDP_ACF.1**

**Security attribute based access control**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

\(^1\) [assignment: access control SFP]

\(^2\) [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
FDP_ACF.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy\(^1\) to objects based on the following: all subjects and objects and the attributes: chip mode, memory range of the accessed object, the EMMU access permission control to control the access permission\(^2\).

FDP_ACF.1.2  The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: evaluate the corresponding chip mode and EMMU access permission control information of the chip mode and memory range of the objects during the access to determine whether the accesses can be granted to perform the operation\(^3\) by the subject.

FDP_ACF.1.3  The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none\(^4\).

FDP_ACF.1.4  The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none\(^5\).

**Cryptographic Support**

FCS_COP.1  Cryptographic operation requires a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance with a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and cryptographic key sizes can be based on an assigned standard.

The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:

- Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with 112 bit key size
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
- Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
- X25519

---

1 [assignment: access control SFP]
2 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
3 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]
4 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
5 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
### TDES Operation
The TDES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

**FCS_COP.1[TDES]**
- **Hierarchical to:** No other components.
- **Dependencies:**
  - [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management],
  - FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS_COP.1.1[TDES]**
The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption\(^1\) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *TDES in ECB mode, CBC mode\(^2\)* and cryptographic key sizes *112 bit\(^3\)* that meet the following NIST SP800-67\(^4\) and NIST SP800-38A\(^5\).

**FCS_CKM.4[TDES]**
- **Cryptographic key destruction[TDES]**
- **Hierarchical to:** No other components.
- **Dependencies:**
  - [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

**FCS_CKM.4.1[TDES]**
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method *by overwriting the TDES key register with a random number\(^5\)* that meets the following: *none\(^6\).*

### AES Operation
The AES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

**FCS_COP.1[AES]**
- **Cryptographic operation**
- **Hierarchical to:** No other components.
- **Dependencies:**
  - [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,]
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1[AES] The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption\(^1\) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in ECB mode, CBC mode\(^2\) and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit\(^3\) that meet the following FIPS PUB 197 [19] and NIST SP800-38A[18]\(^4\).

FCS_CKM.4[AES] Cryptographic key destruction[AES]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1[AES] The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method by overwriting the AES key register with a random number\(^5\) that meets the following: none\(^6\).

- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) operation

The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1[RSA] Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1[RSA] The TSF shall perform signature generation, decryption\(^7\)in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)\(^8\) and cryptographic key sizes from 512 to 4096 bits\(^9\) that meet the following: RSA

---

\(^1\) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
\(^2\) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
\(^3\) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
\(^4\) [assignment: list of standards]
\(^5\) [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
\(^6\) [assignment: list of standards]
\(^7\) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
\(^8\) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
\(^9\) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
Application Notes: The key length is determined by user based on application requirements. User shall assure the security in the application.

FCS_CKM.4[RSA] Cryptographic key destruction[RSA]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1[RSA] The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method by overwriting the PKE RAM with a random number and changing the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key that meets the following: none.

● Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) operation

The Modular Arithmetic and Elliptic Curve point Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1[ECC] Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management, FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction]

FCS_COP.1.1[ECC] The TSF shall perform key exchange, signature generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH/ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes from 192 to 521 bits that meet the following: ECC standard [21][22][24].

Application Notes: The key length is determined by user based on application

---

1 [assignment: list of standards]
2 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
3 [assignment: list of standards]
4 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
5 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
6 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
7 [assignment: list of standards]
requirements. User shall assure the security in the application.

**FCS_CKM.4[ECC] Cryptographic key destruction[ECC]**

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1[ECC] The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method by overwriting the PKE RAM with a random number and changing the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key\(^1\) that meets the following: none\(^2\).

- **X25519 operation**

The Modular Arithmetic and Elliptic Curve point Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

**FCS_COP.1[X25519] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1[X25519] The TSF shall perform key exchange\(^3\) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm \(X25519\) \(^4\) and cryptographic key sizes \(255\) bits\(^5\) that meet the following: \(X25519\) standard \(\text{[23]}\)\(^6\).

Application Notes: The key length is determined by user based on application requirements. User shall assure the security in the application.

**FCS_CKM.4[X25519] Cryptographic key destruction[X25519]**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

---

1 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
2 [assignment: list of standards]
3 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
4 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
5 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
6 [assignment: list of standards]
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1[X25519] The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method by overwriting the PKE RAM with a random number and changing the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key\(^1\) that meets the following: none\(^2\).

### 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The evaluation assurance level is EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. In the following table, the security assurance requirements are given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>ADV_ARC.1</td>
<td>Security Architecture design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADV_FSP.5</td>
<td>Functional specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADV_IMP.2</td>
<td>Implementation representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADV_INT.3</td>
<td>TSF internals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADV_SPM.1</td>
<td>Formal model of Security Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADV_TDS.5</td>
<td>TOE design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance</td>
<td>AGD_OPE.1</td>
<td>Operational user guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>AGD_PRE.1</td>
<td>Preparative procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-Cycle</td>
<td>ALC_CMC.5</td>
<td>CM capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>ALC_CMS.5</td>
<td>CM scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALC_DEL.1</td>
<td>Delivery procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALC_DVS.2</td>
<td>Development security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALC_LCD.1</td>
<td>Life-cycle definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALC_TAT.3</td>
<td>Tools and techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALC_FLR.1</td>
<td>Basic flaw remediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Target</td>
<td>ASE_CCL.1</td>
<td>Conformance claims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^1\) assignment: cryptographic key destruction method

\(^2\) assignment: list of standards
The developer shall provide a formal security policy model.

**ADV_SPM**

**ADV_SPM.1**  
Formal TOE security policy model  
Hierarchical to: No other components  
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification

**ADV_SPM.1.1D**  
The developer shall provide a formal security policy model for the Access Control Policy (*FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1* with the associated dependencies) 1.

### 6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

#### 6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

The security functional requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in PP section 6.3 for the following security functional requirements: *FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDI.2, FDP_SDC.1, FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1, and FAU_SAS.1*.

The security functional requirements *FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, and FCS_COP.1* are defined in the following description:

---

1 [assignment: list of policies that are formally modeled].
Table 13: Rational for additional SFR in the ST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>TOE Security Functional Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.TDES</td>
<td>- FCS_COP.1[TDES] “Cryptographic operation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FCS_CKM.4[TDES] “Cryptographic Key Destruction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.AES</td>
<td>- FCS_COP.1[AES] “Cryptographic operation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FCS_CKM.4[AES] “Cryptographic Key Destruction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.RSA</td>
<td>- FCS_COP.1[RSA] “Cryptographic operation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FCS_CKM.4[RSA] “Cryptographic Key Destruction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.ECC</td>
<td>- FCS_COP.1[ECC] “Cryptographic operation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FCS_CKM.4[ECC] “Cryptographic Key Destruction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.X25519</td>
<td>- FCS_COP.1[X25519] “Cryptographic operation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FCS_CKM.4[X25519] “Cryptographic Key Destruction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Mem-Access</td>
<td>- FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security objectives. The detailed justification is given in the following:

The security functional requirement(s) “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” exactly requires those functions to be implemented which are demanded by O.TDES, O.AES, O.RSA, O.ECC and O.X25519. Therefore, FCS_COP.1 is suitable to meet the security objective.

The usage of cryptographic algorithms requires the use of appropriate keys. Otherwise these cryptographic functions do not provide security. The keys have to be unique with a very high probability, and must have a certain cryptographic strength etc. In case of a key import into the TOE (which is usually after TOE delivery) it has to be ensured that quality and confidentiality are maintained. Keys for TDES and AES are provided by the environment. Keys for RSA, ECC and X25519 algorithm can be provided either by the TOE or the environment.

The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements (both for the TOE and its environment) show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the implementation of an chip modes and area based memory access control as required by O.Mem-Access. The related TOE security functional requirements
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 cover this security objective. The implementation of these functional requirements is represented by the dedicated privilege level concept.

The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there. Moreover, these additional security functional requirements cover the requirements by CC part 2 user data protection of chapter 11 which are not refined by the BSI-PP-0084.

Nevertheless, the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. The TOE only provides the tool to implement the policy defined in the context of the application.

### 6.3.2 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

The dependencies of security functional requirements are defined and described in PP section 6.3.2 for the following security functional requirements: FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SD1.2, FDP_SDC.1, FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1.

The dependence of security functional requirements for the security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FCS_COP.1 and FDP_SDI.2 are defined in the following description.

#### Table 14: Dependency for cryptographic operation requirement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Functional Requirement</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Fulfilled by security requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCS_COP.1[TDES]</td>
<td>FCS_CKM.1</td>
<td>See comment 1</td>
</tr>
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<td>FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if not FCS_CKM.1)</td>
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<td>FCS_CKM.4</td>
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<td>FCS_CKM.1</td>
<td>See comment 1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if not FCS_CKM.1)</td>
<td>See comment 1</td>
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<td>FCS_CKM.4</td>
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<td>FCS_COP.1[ECC]</td>
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</tr>
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<td>See comment 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS_CKM.4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment 1:
The security functional requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” met by the TOE have the following dependencies:

- [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function and are not part of the BSI-PP-0084. Most requirements concerning key management shall be fulfilled by the environment.
since the Security IC Embedded Software is designed for a specific application context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.

For the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1[TDES], FCS_COP.1[AES], FCS_COP.1[RSA], FCS_COP.1[ECC], FCS_COP.1[X25519], the respective dependencies FCS_CKM.1 and FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 are not considered in this Security Target. This is because the decision on how to import user data and how to generate the keys shall be left to the Security IC Embedded Software.

That means that the environment shall meet the requirements FCS_CKM.1 as defined in CC part 2, section 10.1 or shall meet the requirements FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 as defined in CC part 2, section 11.7.

End of Comment

Comment 2:
All security attributes for the Memory Access Control Policy SFP are fixed and require no management or initialization. No objects or information can be created under the SFP, and hence there is no override of associated default values.

End of Comment

6.3.3 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements

The chosen assurance components are based on the underlying PP [6]. The Security Target uses the same augmentations as the PP [6], but chooses a higher assurance level EAL6. The level EAL6 is chosen in order to meet assurance expectations of high security applications. Additionally, the requirement of the PP [6] to choose at least EAL4 is fulfilled.

The rationale for the augmentations is the same as in the PP. The assurance level EAL6 is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The assurance components in an EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL 6. Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL 6, but the mutual support of the requirements is still guaranteed. Therefore, the augmentation with the requirement ALC_FLR.1 were chosen in order to meet the assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs.
As stated in the Section 6.3.3 of the PP [8], it has to be assumed that attackers with high attack potential try to attack smartcards used for high security applications. Therefore, specifically AVA_VAN.5 was chosen by the PP [6] in order to assure that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.

In Table 13 the different assurance components are shown as well as the augmentations.

- **ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation**

Flaw remediation requires that discovered security flaws be tracked and corrected by the developer. Although future compliance with flaw remediation procedures cannot be determined at the time of the TOE evaluation, it is possible to evaluate the policies and procedures that a developer has in place to track and correct flaws, and to distribute the flaw information and corrections.

ALC_FLR.1 has no dependencies.

# 7 TOE summary specification

This chapter provides information to potential users of the TOE how the TOE satisfies the Security Functional Requirements. In addition to the SFRs the TOE has security mechanisms that add to implement the security policies.

## 7.1 Protection against malfunction

Malfunctioning relates to the security functional requirements FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by a group of security measures that guarantee correct operation of the TOE.

The TOE maintains its correct functioning by the following security mechanisms:

- Environmental detectors to verify if the environmental conditions are within the specified range
- Detector self-test verifies the correct functioning of the environmental detectors
- Data integrity checking verifies the correctness of the data read from memory and security sensitive registers
- Total failure checking, continuously repeat data check and statistical tests on random number generator data verifies the quality of the generated random data
If one of the detectors or mechanisms detects an alarm event, the TOE will enter reset state or trigger an exception to make sure a secure situation.

**FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state**

Failures such as frequency, voltage, temperature, light and power glitch that are out of the special range are detected by TOE’s detectors. The failures will cause an alarm signals to be triggered, which will result in a special function register bit to be set and a reset (secure state).

Failures such as total failure, continuously repeat data check and statistical failure are tested by self-tests for random number generator. The failures will cause an alarm signals to be triggered, which will result in a special function register bit to be set and a reset (secure state).

Failures of integrity check are detected by data integrity checking. The failure of integrity check of data reading from NVM will cause an exception. It can be dealt with in exception handler to set the chip into a security state (like reset). The failures of other data will cause an alarm signals to be triggered, which will result in a special function register bit to be set and a reset (secure state).

**FRU_FLT.2: Limited fault tolerance**

In order to prevent malfunction, the operation signals (clock, reset, supply voltage) are filtered/regulated. The detectors that prevent noise, glitches and extremely high/low frequency in the external reset or clock pad are implemented as hardware.

There is a security-delay-latch in TOE.

**7.2 Protection against leakage**

Leakages relate to the security requirements FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 and FPT_ITT.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementing several measures that provides logical protection against leakage.

The TOE prevents information leakage by means of the following security measures:
- Memory encryption
- Address scrambling for memory
- Bus mask
- SCA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions
- DFA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions

**FDP_IFC.1: Subset information flow control**
To prevent data analysis from information stored in memory as well as information on internally transmitted, memory encryption function is applied. The algorithms for the memory encryption are proprietary, and the key used in FLASH encryption is static but different for each chip while the one used in RAM is dynamic. Furthermore the RAM encryption key can be changed by the embedded software.

**FDP ITT.1: Basic internal transfer protection**

The combination of TOE features listed below achieves the effective protection of access to the internal signals.
- Address scrambling for memory
- Memory encryption
- Bus mask
- SCA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions
- DFA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions

**FPT ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection**

The combination of TOE features listed below achieves the effective protection of access to the internal signals.
- Address scrambling for memory
- Memory encryption
- Bus mask
- SCA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions
- DFA countermeasures for all secure cryptographic functions

**7.3 Physical protection**

Physical manipulation and probing relates to the security requirement FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDC.1 and FDP_SDI.2. The TOE meets this SFR by implementing security measures that provides physical protection against physical probing and manipulation.

The following security measures protect the TOE against physical manipulation and probing:
- Active shielding
- Memory integrity checking
- Memory encryption
- Bus mask

If a physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected, an alarm will be automatically triggered by the hardware, which will cause the chip to be reset.
FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attack

This requirement focuses on the security features when the active shield is manipulated so that the features prevent the TOE from physical intrusive attacks. The TOE resets once the physical manipulations or physical probing attacks are detected.

Synthesizable processor core with glue logic makes reverse engineering and signal identification unpractical.

Memory encryption and bus polarity switching prevents memory and address/data buses from probing attacks. Moreover, routing the sensitive signals such as alarm signals or buses in middle layer is effective.

FDP_SDC.1: Stored data confidentiality

All of the data that stored within memory areas are encrypted, thus the attacker can only get the cipher-text data. The encrypt algorithm is not publicity. The address of the stored data is also be encrypted, so it is very difficult to get the stored data by the attacker.

FDP_SDI.2: Stored data integrity monitoring and action

The data stored in memory with checksum code using cyclic redundancy check algorithm to verify the stored data integrity. When the data is fetching from memory, if the data be changed by any abnormal action, there would be a signal to lead exception or reset. The check algorithm is valid in the memory areas including: System RAM and FLASH.

7.4 Protection against abuse of functionality

Abuse of functionality and identification relates to the security requirements FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 and FAU_SAS.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementing a complicated test mode control mechanism that prevents abuse of test functionality delivered as part of the TOE.

Test functionality is permanently disabled after production by a combination of physical and logical security measures.

FAU_SAS.1: Audit storage

In the test mode, a proprietary protocol is used to write the identification by the TEST administrator during the manufacturing process. The manufacturing data written into
the non-user FLASH of the TOE are READ ONLY once the TOE is set from test mode to non-test mode.

**FMT_LIM.1: Limited capabilities**

The access to the test mode is limited, which means only by supplying an authentication code through a proprietary protocol. Furthermore, once the TOE is switched to non-test mode, the test mode is unavailable any more. The access to the debug mode is limited. Furthermore, once the TOE is switched to Non-debug mode, the debug mode is unavailable any more.

**FMT_LIM.2: Limited availabilities**

The access to the test mode is limited, which means only by supplying an authentication code through a proprietary protocol. Furthermore, once the TOE is switched to non-test mode, the test mode is unavailable any more. Only under test mode, functional test is able to be conducted. The access to the debug mode is limited. Furthermore, once the TOE is switched to Non-debug mode, the debug mode is unavailable any more. Only under test mode, functional test is able to be conducted.

### 7.5 Random number generator

Random numbers relate to the security requirement FCS_RNG.1. The TOE meets this SFR by providing a random number generator.

**FCS_RNG.1: Random number generation**

Random number generation algorithm that follows the requirements and the metric of the AIS20/31[2013] Class DRG.3 standard and a True Random Number Generator for AIS20/31[2013] Class PTG.2 Random Number Generator fulfills this requirement.

### 7.6 Cryptographic functionality

Cryptographic functionality relates the security requirements FCS_COP.1[TDES], FCS_COP.1[AES], FCS_COP.1[rsa], FCS_COP.1[ECC], FCS_COP.1[X25519], FCS_CKM.4[TDES] , FCS_CKM.4[AES] , FCS_CKM.4[RSA], FCS_CKM.4[ECC] and FCS_CKM.4[X25519]. The TOE meets these SFRs by providing cryptographic functionality by means of a combination of accelerating hardware and IC dedicated support software.
FCS COP.1: Cryptographic operation

- **TDES**
The TOE provides TDES symmetric algorithm according to the NIST SP800-67[17] and NIST SP800-38A[18] standard. TDES symmetric algorithm is used for the TOE in encrypting and decrypting data. The TDES symmetric algorithm works with 112 bits key size. The TOE provides TDES with supporting ECB/CBC mode.

- **AES**
The TOE provides AES symmetric algorithm according to the FIPS 197[19] and NIST SP800-38A[18] standard. AES symmetric algorithm is used for the TOE in encrypting and decrypting data. The AES symmetric algorithm works with 128/192/256 bits key size. The TOE provides AES with supporting ECB/CBC mode.

- **RSA**
The TSF shall perform signature generation and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and cryptographic key sizes from 512 to 2048 bits and 4096 bits that meet the RSA standard [16].

- **ECC**
The TSF shall perform signature generation and key exchange in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH/ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes from 192 to 521 bits that meet the ECC standard [24].

- **X25519**
The TSF shall perform key exchange in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm x25519 and cryptographic key size is 255 bits that meet the X25519 standard [23].

FCS CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction

- **TDES**
The TOE provides TDES key destruction. The TDES key destruction method is to cover the TDES key register using random number.

- **AES**
The TOE provides AES key destruction. The AES key destruction method is to cover the AES key register using random number.

- **RSA**
The TOE provides key destruction. The method is to cover the PKE RAM using random number and change the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key.

- **ECC**
The TOE provides key destruction. The method is to cover the PKE RAM using random number and change the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key.

- **X25519**
The TOE provides key destruction. The method is to cover the PKE RAM using random number and change the PKE RAM encryption key and address scrambling key.

7.7 Memory access control

**FDP ACC.1: Subset access control**
**FDP ACF.1: Security attributes based access control**

Memory access control is related to these requirements. The EMMU is responsible for memory access control based on memory address range and chip modes. Invalid access will be denied.

8. Bibliography

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