

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode FFHDD3_1/10

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1 Summary

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [AC], the developer's Impact Analysis Report [IAR] and evaluator's assessment [EA]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report [CR], the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified under NSCIB, reference NSCIB-CC-2300039-01.

The changes to the certified product are related to a minor change to the user manuals and delivery procedure not impacting the security functionality of the certified product. The identification of the maintained product is not changed as only the delivery procedure and acceptance procedure is updated. Therefore the identification of the maintained product is Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode FFHDD3_1/10.

Consideration of the nature of the changes leads to the conclusion that they can be classified as minor changes and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [CR] is maintained for the new version of the product.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report NSCIB-CC-2300039-01-CR [CR] and reproduction is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.

2 Assessment

2.1 Introduction

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [AC], the developer's Impact Analysis Report [IAR] and evaluator's assessment [EA]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report [CR], the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the NSCIB under NSCIB-CC-2300039-01.

On 2024-03-01 Fox Crypto B.V. submitted a request for assurance maintenance for the Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode FFHDD3_1/10.

NSCIB has assessed the [IAR] according to the requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [AC].

In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

This is supported by the evaluator's assessment [EA].

2.2 Description of Changes

The TOE is a unidirectional network, allowing data to travel only in one direction (data-diode).

The one-way physical connection of the TOE allows information to be transferred optically from one network (the upstream network) to another network (the downstream network). The unidirectionality of the data flow ensures the integrity of the upstream network against threats from the downstream network, and simultaneously ensures the confidentiality of the downstream network.

The changes to the certified product as described in the [IAR] are only related to a minor change to the user manuals and delivery procedure not impacting the security functionality of the certified product. This update to the user manuals and delivery procedure was classified by developer [IAR] and original evaluator [EA] as minor changes with no impact on security.

Configuration Management procedures did not require a change in the product identifier.

The configuration list for the TOE has been updated as a result of the changes to include the updated Security Target [ST], installation manual [UGM_IM], Delivery Procedures [UGM_DEL] Advanced Support [UGM_SUP] and Measurable Life-Cycle Model [MLCM].

3 Conclusion

Consideration of the nature of the changes leads to the conclusion that they can be classified as minor changes and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [CR] is maintained for this version of the product.

4 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report:

[AC]	Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, Version 2.2, 30 September 2021
[UGM_IM]	FDDV3_MAN_FOX_CRYPT_0001, Installation Manual, Fox Crypto B.V. User Guidance v1.4, 2024, 20 February 2024
[UGM_DEL]	FFHDDv3-AGD-ALC_DEL.1 v3.4 , Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode – Delivery Procedures, Preparative Procedures and Operational User Guidance – Common Criteria FFHDD – EAL7+, 26 February 2024
[UGM_SUP]	FFHDD-ALC_CMC_CMS.5 v3.05, Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode – Advanced Support –Common Criteria FFHDD – EAL7+, 26 February 2024
[LCDM]	FFHDD-ALC_LCD.2, v3.4 – 2024 Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode – Measurable Life-Cycle Model – Common Criteria FFHDD – EAL7+, 26 February 2024
[CR]	Certification Report Fort Fox Hardware Data Diode FFHDD3_1/10, NSCIB-CC-2300039-01-CR, 19 September 2023
[EA]	Impact Assessment Report review, NSCIB-CC-2300039-01-MA, 19-March-2024
[IAR]	FFHDD3 1/10 Assurance Continuity - Maintenance Impact Analysis Report, Version 1.4, 22 February 2024
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022
[ST]	FORT FOX HARDWARE DATA DIODE Security Target Common Criteria FFHDD – EAL7+, Version 3.4, 21 February 2024

(This is the end of this report).