

Certification Report

ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0

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Report number:	NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR
Report version:	1
Project number:	NSCIB-2300051-01
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Date:	12 December 2023
Number of pages:	12
Number of appendices:	0

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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <https://www.sogis.eu>.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0. The developer of the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0 is Giesecke+Devrient ePayments GmbH located in München, Germany and Veridos GmbH located in München, Germany was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is an applet named ePass applet based on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 platform, which is used as an ICAO eMRTD, which can be configured to support the different authentication mechanisms.

The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was completed on 12 December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the

- EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality when authentication method PACE is used and EAC is not used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
- EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality when authentication method PACE and EAC are used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
- EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality when authentication method BAC are used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing modules).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0 from Veridos GmbH, Identity Solutions by Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei located in München, Germany.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

	Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
IC	Hardware	IFX SLC37GDA448/512 IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Ch Registered under the certification id BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022	T11 (design step)
	Firmware	BOS & POWS (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022)	80.306.16.0 & 80.306.16.1
		Flash Loader (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022)	09.12.0005
	Software	UMSLC (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022)	v01.30.0564
Platform	Software (embedded)	Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 registered under the certification id NSCIB-CC-2300005-01	C2
Applet	Software	ePass Applet	V1.0 (build 25)

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.

For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.3 or [ST-lite], Chapter 2.3.

2.2 Security Policy

The TOE has the following main security features

- Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in the communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal supporting the protocols BAC, SAC(PACE) as per [ICAO_9303_11] and EAC as per [TR-03110_1]
- Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document as per [TR-03110_1]
- Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside as per [TR-03110_1]
- Means to check authenticity of the terminal, Terminal Authentication as per [TR-03110_1]
- Means to prove authenticity of the chip by means of Active Authentication or Chip Authentication as per [TR-03110_1]
- Chip authentication followed by terminal authentication used as a precondition to provide access to biometric data known as EAC, as per [TR-03110_1]

2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5 of the [ST] or [ST-lite].

2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure as a whole.

The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.

The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.

2.4 Architectural Information

The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as follows:



The TOE is an applet named ePass applet based on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 platform, which is used as an ICAO eMRTD, which can be configured to support the different authentication mechanisms.

2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
Guidance Documentation ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Main Document, dated 28 July 2023	0.7
Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase, ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, dated 28 July 2023	0.9
Guidance Documentation for the Initialization and Personalization Phase ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, Version 1.7/Status 06.09.2022, dated 04 August 2023	1.7
EPASS Applet EPASS10-100, Personalization Concept, dated 09 March 2023	2.4

EPASS Applet EPASS10-100, Usage Phase Commands, dated 17 July 2023	1.2
Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, dated 10 July 2023	2.7

2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.

2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:

- When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
- For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [ETRfC-Platform] of the underlying platform.
- All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators was three weeks. During that test campaign, 50% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 50% on logical tests.

2.6.3 Test configuration

The TOE was tested in the following configurations:

- ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0.

2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused by composition.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0.

2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0, to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 5 ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5** when authentication method PACE is used and EAC is not used in order to conform to [PP_0068], **EAL 5 ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5** when authentication method PACE and EAC are used in order to conform to [PP_0056] or **EAL 4 ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2** when authentication method BAC are used in order to conform to [PP_0055]. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

The Security Target claims 'strict' conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0055], [PP_0056] and [PP_0068].

2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: <none>.

Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a “high attack potential”, appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

3 Security Target

The ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target, Version 2.0, Dated 09 October 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.

Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified according to [ST-SAN].

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

BAC	Basic Access Control
EAC	Extended Access Control
eMRTD	electronic MRTD
IC	Integrated Circuit
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP	Protection Profile
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
- [ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “EPass Applet on Sm@rtCafé Expert 8.0 C2” – EAL4+/EAL5+, 23-RPT-1105, Version 2.0, Dated 22 November 2023
- [HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022 for IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware 80.306.16.0 & 80.306.16.1, optional NRG SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.15.000 and v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.33.003 and v3.02.000, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and guidance, dated 16 May 2022
- [HW-ETRF(C)] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022, Version 5, 2022-05-11, “ETR for Composition”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
- [HW-ST] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022, Version 4.3.1, 2022-05-10, “IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11 Security Target Lite”, v 4.3.1, dated 10 May 2022
- [ICAO_9303_11] International Civil Aviation Organization, DOC 9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents Seventh Edition – 2015 Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTD's
- [JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
- [JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
- [NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022
- [PP_0055] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009

- [PP_0056] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012
- [PP_0068] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0.1, 22 July 2014, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-MA-01
- [ST] ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target, Version 2.0, Dated 09 October 2023
- [ST-lite] ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target Lite , Version 2.0, Dated 09 October 2023
- [ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
- [TR-03110_1] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1 Version 2.20, 26. February 2015

(This is the end of this report.)