# Security Target

#### ST introduction

The reference of this ST is **Secure Element** N5C2M0029E7D0600 with **MIFARE DESFire EV2** 1.5.7.1JxU **Security Target version v1.5\_4**, date 07.08.2023

#### TOE

The TOE is **an open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification **[MIFARE-DES-EV2]** and the access control in the MIFARE services. See PP(s) for details.

## TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Secure Element** N5C2M0029E7D0600 with **MIFARE DESFire EV2** 1.5.7.1JxU, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

Field	Value
VendorID	0x04
HWMajorVersion	0x62
HWMinorVersion	0x00
SWMajorVersion	0x02
SWMinorVersion	0x07
CWCY	<u>1120</u>

In addition, the TOE can be uniquely identified as per the JCOP user guidance manual [JCOP-UGM], using the GET DATA command with 0xDF20 tag, as follows:

Field	Value
JCOP ID	N5C2M0029E7D0600

#### TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification	Date of
component			identifier	certificate
				issue
Hardware IC	SN100_SE B2.1 C58	(diced)	ICCN0254	2018-05-25
		wafer/module/card		
Crypto	Crypto Library v2.0.0	Embedded in the	Included in	2018-05-25
libraries		above	ICCN	
JavaCard	N5C2M0029E7D0600	Embedded in the	PCN0156.10	2018-06-19
		above		
MIFARE	1.5.7.1JxU	Embedded in the	Functional:	2020-06-29
applet		above	D2A_2006_003	
			Security:	
			MF-1900018-04	

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

#### Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to [MIFARE DESFIRE PP] (called "PP(s)" in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

# Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

## Objectives

See PP(s).

#### Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

## Security Requirements

#### Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

#### Security Assurance Requirements

See section "Conformance claims".

#### Rationale See PP(s).

# **TOE Summary Specification**

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA\_VAN.5 level.

#### References

[MIFARE-DES-EV2]MIFARE DESFire EV2 Reference Architecture, Rev. 1.4 (ra321914)[MIFARE DESFIRE PP]MIFARE DESFire EV1/EV2/EV3 Protection Profile v1.5[JCOP-UGM] JCOP 5.2 R2 User Guidance Manual Rev. 1.7, 13 March 2023