

Security Target

ST introduction

The reference of this ST is **Secure Element N5C2M0029E7D0600 with MIFARE DESFire EV1 1.5.6.2JxU Security Target version v1.5_3, date 07.08.2023**

TOE

The TOE is **an open platform** implementing the MIFARE specification [**MIFARE-DES-EV1**] and the access control in the MIFARE services.

See PP(s) for details.

TOE reference

The TOE is referred to as **Secure Element N5C2M0029E7D0600 with MIFARE DESFire EV1 1.5.6.2JxU**, and is named and uniquely identified using the GetVersion command as follows:

Field	Value
VendorID	0x04
HWMajorVersion	0x61
HWMinorVersion	0x00
SWMajorVersion	0x01
SWMinorVersion	0x06
<u>CWCY</u>	<u>1120</u>

In addition, the TOE can be uniquely identified as per the JCOP user guidance manual [JCOP-UGM], using the GET DATA command with 0xDF20 tag, as follows:

<u>Field</u>	<u>Value</u>
<u>JCOP ID</u>	N5C2M0029E7D0600

TOE overview

The TOE consists of the following:

TOE component	Identification	Form of delivery	Certification identifier	Date of certificate issue
Hardware IC	SN100_SE B2.1 C58	(diced) wafer/module/card	ICCN0254	2018-05-25
Crypto libraries	Crypto Library v2.0.0	Embedded in the above	Included in ICCN	2018-05-25
JavaCard	N5C2M0029E7D0600	Embedded in the above	PCN0156.10	2018-06-19
MIFARE applet	1.5.6.2JxU	Embedded in the above	Functional: D1A_2006_002 Security: MF-1900017-05	2020-06-29

Only (pre-)personalisation guidance is provided. No operational guidance other than the MIFARE specifications is provided.

Any (pre-)personalisation performed by the developer of the TOE on behalf of its customers will lead to a state identical to states possible by executing the MIFARE commands for personalisation.

Conformance claims

This ST claims strict compliance to **[MIFARE DESFIRE PP]** (called “PP(s)” in the remainder of this document) under Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5.

Exactly the SFRs of the PP(s) are included by reference, no omissions nor additions have been made. The ST is therefore CC Part 2 conformant.

The assurance package is **EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2**. The ST is therefore CC Part 3 conformant.

The rationale behind this claim is the requirement that the MIFARE security evaluation scheme requires compliance to this PP(s) for this TOE type (MIFARE products).

Security Problem Definition

See PP(s).

Objectives

See PP(s).

Extended components definition

There are no extended components, see PP(s).

Security Requirements

Security Functional Requirements

See PP(s). Note that the PP has no open operations.

Security Assurance Requirements

See section “Conformance claims”.

Rationale

See PP(s).

TOE Summary Specification

The TOE implements the SFRs by access control to the MIFARE services in accordance to the MIFARE specification, sufficiently hardened to counter attackers at AVA_VAN.5 level.

References

[MIFARE-DES-EV1] MIFARE DESFire EV1 Interface Specification, Rev. 1.1 (ts335111)

[MIFARE DESFIRE PP] MIFARE DESFire EV1/EV2/EV3 Protection Profile v1.5

[JCOP-UGM] JCOP 5.2 R2 User Guidance Manual Rev. 1.7, 13 March 2023